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POWER PRODUCTION AND REGULATORY REFORM: EASING
THE TRANSITION TO AN ECONOMIC ENERGY FUTURE
RICHARD GOLDSMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Power production and the regulation of the electric utility in-
dustry are presently at a crossroads. With new capacity costs rising
far faster than revenues, many utilities have been forced to defer
or cancel the construction of new generating stations.' This curtail-
ment of planned expansion has raised the spectre of future capac-
ity shortages and elicited proposals from many policymakers of
major regulatory initiatives designed to stimulate renewed con-
struction.2 Others, more dubious about the wisdom of the indus-
try's continued commitment to large coal or nuclear units, have
contended instead that adequate energy supplies can be better as-
sured by policies designed to encourage both conservation and the
development of alternative energy sources.3 Regardless of one's
view, it is clear that society pays a high price for the construction
of either too much or too little generating capacity. Once the
source of economies of scale which paved the way to cheap electric-
* Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.
1. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRIC POWERPLANT CANCELLATIONS AND DE-
LAYS: 1980 REP. TO THE CONGRESS. One hundred eighty-four facilities, representing 26% of
1979 generating capacity, were cancelled outright between 1974 and 1978. Id. at 6.
2. A report recently prepared by the Congressional Budget Office for the Senate Com-
mittee on Energy and Natural Resources examines a range of "policy options" for stimulat-
ing new generating capacity, including increased federal tax subsidies, federal preemption of
ratemaking policies, regional control of capacity planning, and total deregulation of bulk
power supply. See Financial Health, Regulation of Utilities Must Improve for Sake of Fu-
ture Power Costs, 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 1184 (Dec. 2, 1982). Similar proposals are
also under consideration by an executive agency task force known as the Electricity Policy
Project. See One-Time Rate Hike of 12.5 Percent Recommended To Bolster Sagging Econ-
omy, 10 ENERGY USERS RP. (BNA) 1079 (Oct. 28, 1982). See also Task Force Recommends
Reform Package to Streamline Licensing, Boost Industry, 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA)
1164 (Nov. 25, 1982). There, a proposal by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to
"streamline" the nuclear power plant licensing process in order to encourage new nuclear
construction is discussed.
3. See, e.g., ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HAnvAD Busi-
NESS SCHOOL (Stobaugh & Yergin ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY FUTURE].
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ity, new baseload generating units now cost more than one billion
dollars, many times that of older plants. Overbuilding thus may
impose a heavy financial burden on consumers. In addition, the op-
eration of coal and nuclear units each present significant, little-un-
derstood risks to public health, safety and the quality of the envi-
ronment. Underbuilding, on the other hand, invites power
shortages-extraordinarily disruptive events whether they are
called "blackouts," "brownouts" or "outages"-or the use of far
more expensive generating equipment, such as gas turbines, to
meet baseload energy requirements.
Society thus has a vital interest in minimizing the risk of error
in baseload capacity expansion. This Article suggests that this in-
terest is not being protected by existing institutional arrange-
ments. Section I examines the history of and need for governmen-
tal regulation of capacity expansion. After reviewing the origins
and modern-day ramifications of the electric utility industry's
commitment to centralized growth, the conclusion is reached that
traditional cost-of-service regulation cannot operate to counteract
the economic incentives for overexpansion which still exist. Section
II then examines the current regulatory approach, which has
evolved into a form of licensing, with government approval of util-
ity proposed expansion hinging upon an evaluation of long-range
forecasts of both the demand for electricity and the relative eco-
nomics of alternative modes of generation. It is concluded that this
approach has been a failure as well, not only because the fifteen to
twenty year forecasts upon which it depends cannot be made
within a tolerable margin of error, but also because it equates the
"need" for new generating stations with the "demand" for electric-
ity. This equation tends to obscure decentralized alternatives to
continued capacity expansion. In Section III, a closer analysis of
existing regulatory institutions leads to two recommendations:
First, regulation should be restructured; the authority to make
"need for power" determinations should be centered in state pub-
lic utility commissions, to be exercised in the context of developing
state-wide plans for energy supply. Second, the electric utilities
should be given the opportunity and the incentive to develop en-
ergy sources other than central station generation. Such an ap-
proach, which promotes "good" investment decisions by the indus-
try, seems vastly preferable to one which relies upon the
prevention of "bad" choices by the government.
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I. THE CASE FOR REGULATION
A. The History of Public Regulation of Capacity Expansion
Seventy-eight percent of the nation's electricity is produced by
private, investor-owned utilities.4 Beginning as small companies
conducting business in fiercely competitive environments, 5 utilities
rapidly evolved into large, vertically integrated enterprises supply-
ing electricity as publicly regulated monopolies.6 At the turn of the
century, thirty-six hundred separate systems produced about six
billion kilowatt hours of electricity; today, 95% fewer firms pro-
duce three hundred times as much energy.7 The impetus for this
transformation was, of course, the presence of large economies of
scale, 8 particularly in power generation. Larger generating units
lead to lower unit prices; these, in turn, lead to greater demand,
and then to further capacity expansion, a cumulative and self-rein-
forcing process which delivered progressively cheaper electricity to
the entire nation.' Under these conditions, continuous growth be-
came an "axiom" 10 of the electric power industry, and capacity ex-
pansion was considered a managerial prerogative."1
4. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN
THE UNITED STATEs-1979, at 15 (Oct. 1980). The remaining generation is produced by the
federal government (10.5%), state and local utilities (9%) and rural cooperatives (2.5%). Id.
5. See generally Novick, The Electric Power Industry, 17 ENV'T 8 (1975); F. McDoN-
ALD, INSULL (1962) (describing the career of Samuel Insull, one of the early magnates in the
electrical power industry).
6. See 1 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE NATIONAL POWER GRID STUDY 19-22 (1980); As-
SOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT. THE
REFORM OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 23-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRICITY AND THE EN-
VIRONMENT]; FEDERAL POWER COMM'N, THE NATIONAL POWER SURVEY, pt. I, ch. II (1970);
Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 64, 67-69 (1972).
7. See S. BREYER & P. MACAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION By THE FEDERAL POWER COM-
MISSION 90 (1974); DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILI-
TIES IN THE UNITED STATEs-1979, supra note 4, at 12.
8. See THE NATIONAL POWER GRID STUDY, supra note 6, at 19; Gilmer & Meunier, Elec-
tric Utilities and Solar Energy: The Service Contract in a New Social Context, 30 MERCER
L. REV. 377, 378 (1979); Economies Of Scale In The Electric Power Industry, in VALUES IN
THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (K. Sayre ed. 1977); Hughes, Scale Frontiers In Electric
Power, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES (W. Capron ed. 1971).
9. MANCKE, SQUEAKING BY: U.S. ENERGY POLICY SINCE THE EMBARGO 133-36 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SQUEAKING BY]; Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Struc-
tural Change in the Process of Public Utility Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974); 2 A.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS, 12 (1971).
10. Novick, supra note 5, at 7.
11. See generally Joskow, supra note 9, at 291; E. BERLIN, C. CiCcHETrI & W. GILLEN,
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In the late 1960s the economics of power production changed
rather dramatically."2 Further economies of scale seemed to van-
ish,13 and inflation combined with soaring interest rates to assure
that the marginal cost of new generating capacity would far exceed
the average cost of existing plants. 4 Under these conditions, the
expansion of generating capacity now could be expected to lead to
higher average production costs, which would lead to higher rates;
these, in turn, would lead to reduced demand, and then to further
rate increases in order to realize revenues required to cover fixed
costs. This, too, was a self-reinforcing process, but this time one
which delivered progressively more expensive electricity to the
nation.
Other implications of new capacity were also of mounting con-
cern. Nuclear power plants posed a risk to public health and
safety,15 fossil-fired generating units fouled the air,16 and hydroe-
lectric facilities consumed scarce recreational and aesthetic re-
sources.1 7 At a time when landmark legislation had just proclaimed
the nation's commitment to the protection of environmental val-
ues,18 there appeared to be no greater threat to these values than
the expansion plans of the electric utilities. 9 Indeed, by calling for
PERSPECTIVE ON POWER: A STUDY OF THE REGULATION AND PRICING OF ELECTRIC POWER 53
(1975).
12. Joskow, supra note 9, at 312-13; SQUEAKING By, supra note 9, at 133-34; ENERGY
POLICY PRoJECT, A TIME To CHOOSE, at 256-57 (1974).
13. See Loose & Flaim, Economies of Scale and Reliability: The Economics of Large
Versus Small Generating Units, 4 ENERGY Sys. & POL'Y J. 37 (1980); Jones, Example of a
Regulatory Alternative to Antitrust: New York Utilities in the Early Seventies, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 462, 501 (1973).
14. SQUEAKING By, supra note 9, at 135; BERLIN, CICCHETTI & GILLEN, supra note 11, at
1-11.
15. ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 33-38. For a bibliography of
the then-contemporary literature, see S. EBBIN & R. KASPER, CITIZEN GROUPS AND THE NU-
CLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY 295-302 (1974).
16. See ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 28-33; JAFFEE & TRINlE,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 120-40 (1971).
17. See generally ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 42-43; A. TAL-
BOT, POWER ALONG THE HUDSON: THE STORM KING CASE AND THE BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTAL-
IsM (1972).
18. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (1970). Signed on January 1, 1970, the law quickly became the formal charter of a
nationwide environmental "movement." The first "Earth Day" was celebrated on April 3,
1970.
19. See generally ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6; OFFICE OF SCIENCE
& TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1970); Hearings Before the Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy on the Envtl. Effects of Producing Elec. Power, pts. 1 & 2, 91st
[Vol. 32224
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the addition of one million megawatts (Mw) of new capacity be-
tween 1970 and 1990,20 these plans seemed to challenge the very
foundations of the emerging environmental movement. Just as
people began to perceive the existence of real and perhaps very
near "limits to growth,"21 the electric utility industry projected ex-
ponential growth in perpetuity.22 Understandably, these projec-
tions tended to polarize the environmental debate. Battle lines
were quickly drawn, and by 1970 any proposal for a new generating
station invariably drew stiff opposition from environmentalists
who demanded some showing that the new capacity was really
"needed. 23
Today, the problems which ten years ago forced the "need for
power" decision from the private boardroom to the public hearing
room are even more serious. First, the cost of new power plants has
continued to skyrocket.24 Nuclear units first announced in the
early 1970s are now being completed at anywhere from three to ten
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Atomic Energy Hearings].
20. See Atomic Energy Hearings I, supra note 19, at 55. According to an analysis made
by the staff of the Federal Power Commission (FPC), this projection envisioned
the construction of about 40 new hydroelectric installations of 100 megawatts
(Mw) or more, some 50 new pumped storage hydroelectric projects of 300 mega-
watts or more and about 250 fossil and nuclear steam electric plants having ca-
pacities ranging in size from 1000 to 4000 megawatts... [as well as] substantial
additions at many hydroelectric and steam generating plants currently in
service.
Id.
21. See, e.g., D.H. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS, & W. BEHRENS, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH
(1972); ROYAL COMM'N ON ENVTL. POLLUTION, FIRST REPORT (1971), and Boulding, The Eco-
nomics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrIY IN A GROWING ECONOMY
3-14 (H. Jarrett ed. 1971). These well-known works illustrate the contemporary concern
with the implications of exponential growth.
22. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Hearings II, supra note 19, at 1809; ELECTRICITY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 161-85. For a collection of comments indicating the range of
the controversy sparked by the industry's growth forecasts, see JOINT COMMrrr ON ATOMIC
ENERGY, 92ND CONG., 1ST SESS., NUCLEAR POWER AND RELATED ENERGY PROBLEMs-1968
THROUGH 1970, 10-13, 36-53, 67-82 (Comm. Print 1971).
23. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972). See Atomic Energy Hearings II, supra note 19, at 1809;
Atomic Energy Hearings I, supra note 19, at 7, 67-68, 298, 308 (1969); EBBIN & KASPER,
supra note 15, at 1-14; D. NELKIN, NUCLEAR POWER AND ITS CRITICS 5-19 (1971); JAFFEE &
TRIBE, supra note 16, at 120-40.
24. See generally, KOMANOFF, POWER PLANT COST ESCALATIONS: NUCLEAR AND COAL
CAPITAL COSTS, REGULATION AND ECONOMICS (1982); BUtrP & DERAIN, LIGHT WATEm How THE
NUCLEAR DREAM DISSOLVED (1978).
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times their original estimated cost.25 The end, moreover, is no-
where in sight. More stringent reactor regulation in the aftermath
of the accident at Three Mile Island has left the future of nuclear
capital costs "unknown and unknowable."26
At the same time, the typical utility has faced drastically de-
creased access to capital markets.2 7 Lacking external sources of
funds, the companies thus have had to seek repeated rate increases
from the rate regulators who, also constrained by the imperatives
of the capital markets, have had no alternative but to grant them.28
25. See Special Report in ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) No. 371, at 19 (Sept. 18, 1980).
The experience of two New York utilities is illustrative. In 1969, the Niagara Mohawk
Power Corporation brought into service a 610 Mw reactor which it had built for $188 mil-
lion, a capacity cost of $270/Kw. In 1972, the company applied for permission to add an
1100 Mw unit at the same site, which it proposed to build by 1978 for $381 million, about
$350/Kw. See ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: THE NINE MILE
POINT NUCLEAR STATION 10-12 (1973). Completion has since been deferred to 1986 and di-
rect construction costs are now estimated to exceed $2.4 billion, about $2,200/Kw. See Spe-
cial Report, supra, at 20. See also Financial and Economic Cost Implications of Construct-
ing the Nine Mile Point No. 2 Station, NYPSC Opinion No. 82-7, at 18, (Apr. 16, 1982). In
1969, the Long Island Lighting Co. proposed the construction of an 820 Mw reactor which it
estimated would cost $261 million, about $300/Nw. See Wald, How the Shoreham Reactor's
Costs Soared, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1980, at 82, col. 4. Originally planned for service in 1975,
the unit is now scheduled for completion in 1983 at an estimated cost of $2.2 billion, about
$2600/Kw. Id. at col. 5.
26. This was the conclusion of the New York Energy Planning Board, the agency re-
sponsible for planning the energy future of New York State. See NEw YORK ENERGY PLAN-
NING BD., STATE ENERGY MASTER PLANNING AND LONG-RANGE ELECTRIC AND GAS SYSTEM
PLANNING PROCEEDINGS 116 n.14 (1980) [hereinafter cited as STATE ENERGY PLANNING PRO-
CEEDINGS]. The Tennessee Valley Authority, the largest developer of nuclear power in the
country, concurs. See ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) No. 349 at 7-8 (Apr. 17, 1980). Cf In re
Commonwealth Edison Co., [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] PUB. UTI,. L. REP. (CCH) 23,227,
at 53,686 (Oct. 15, 1980) (discussing the high cost of post-Three Mile Island (TMI) engi-
neering requirements).
27. See generally OFFICE OF RESEARCH, N.Y. DF'T OF PUB. SERv., ALTERNATIVES FOR
ELECTRIC UTILITY FINANCING. (1975). A new and disturbing consequence of the electric util-
ity industry's loss of access to traditional capital markets has been an increasing tendency
for it to finance construction projects with short-term funds. See Bennett, Banks Fill Utili-
ties' Credit Gap, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1980, at D1, col. 3. Since a generating unit has a
useful life of at least thirty years, this makes it impossible to calculate the capital costs of a
plant in advance.
28. Consider, for example, the heroic efforts made by the New York Public Service
Commission to relieve the problems experienced by the Long Island Lighting Co. in its
struggle to finance its construction of the Shoreham Nuclear Generating Station. In re Long
Island Lighting Co., 15 Op. NYPSC 15 (1975); In re Long Island Lighting Co., 16 Op.
NYPSC 497 (1976); In re Long Island Lighting Co., 18 Op. NYPSC 45 (1978); In re Long
Island Lighting Co., NYPSC Opinion No. 79-14 (Apr. 27, 1979). These efforts have been
upheld by the courts; see Cohalon v. Gioia, 88 A.D.2d 722, 723, 451 N.Y.S,2d 275 (1982)
("economic hardship upon customers may not justify reducing rates below the minimum
1983] REGULATING POWER PRODUCTION 227
These rate increases continue to have serious consequences: They
simultaneously aggravate both the conditions of inflation and re-
cession which have combined to produce the intractable problem
of "stagflation"; 9 they contribute to an erosion of public confi-
dence in government; 0 and they threaten to initiate an accelerat-
ing spiral of sales declines which, in the long run, presents a genu-
ine risk of utility bankruptcies. 31
necessary for a utility to recover its prudently incurred costs, including a reasonable rate of
return on its investment"). Some public utility commissions (PUCs) have attempted to
avoid this merry-go-round by prohibiting further investment in new generating units; see,
e.g., In re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 20, 233 (N.H. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, July 16, 1982); Pennslyvania PUC Prohibits Completion of Limerick Unit 2, 10
ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 896 (Sept. 2, 1982).
29. Soaring utility rates have imposed severe hardships on low income consumers. This
has sparked a variety of proposals-known generally as "lifeline" -for the redesign of rate
structures to enable the poor to obtain "basic" electric service at "affordable" rates. See,
e.g., CAL. CODE ANN. § 739 (West 1982) (authorizing the California PUC to designate lifeline
volumes of gas and electricity); Lifeline Concept and Electric Rate Structures, 18 Op.
NYPSC 1223 (1978). Federal law now requires each of the states to determine whether life-
line rates should be adopted by its utilities. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 114(b), 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 717 (Supp. V.
(1981))). The wisdom and legality of such rates have by now been the focus of extensive
debate. See Gas & Electric Utility Rate Structure, 24 Pun. UTm. REP. 4th, at 332 (Apr. 4,
1978) (implementing CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE, § 739 (1975)); Wilson & Chun, Equity and So-
cial Ends in Rate-Setting: An Examination of Lifeline Rates, 16 GONZ. L. REV. 579 (1981);
Aman & Howard, Natural Gas and Electric Utility Rate Reform: Taxation Through
Ratemaking?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1083 (1977).
The rising cost of utility services has also contributed to unemployment and, in some
instances, the relocation of business and industry. See NEW YORK PUn. SERV. COMM'N,
STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIC IMPACT ON RATE CASES 3 (1980);
In re Consolidated Edison Co., NYPSC Opinion No. 79-4 at 2 (Mar. 6, 1979); In re Long
Island Lighting Co., NYPSC Opinion No. 79-14 at 1 (Apr. 27, 1979) (Comm'rs Mead &
Burstein, dissenting). See also Industrial Users Win TVA Campaign To Defer Three Nu-
clear Power Plants, 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 251-52 (Mar. 11, 1982) (industrial cus-
tomers of TVA claim continued construction of nuclear units will cost jobs).
30. This erosion of confidence was especially evident when, in response to the decline in
sales which followed the Arab oil embargo, some utilities obtained rate increases which ill-
advisedly were termed "conservation adjustments." These increases elicited an outpouring
of protest from consumers who felt they were being "penalized" for their successful efforts
at conservation. PUC "explanations" did little to soothe their indignation. See In re Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., NYPSC Opinion No. 79-5, at 6 (Mar. 8, 1979); In re Long Island
Lighting Co., NYPSC Opinion No. 79-14, at 1 (Apr. 27, 1979) (Comm'rs Mead & Burstein,
dissenting) (10,000 protests and 115 speakers at four days of hearings). See also In re Pa-
cific Gas and Electric Co., Cal. PUC Opinion D.82-08-014, at 4 (Aug. 4, 1982) (strong con-
sumer opposition to proposed conservation incentive program because of perception that
"when efficiency occurs, rates go up"); Turner, Pacific Rates Provoke Protest, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 15, 1982, at D7, col. 1.
31. There is growing support among economists for the view that the long run effects of
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Second, the health, safety and environmental risks of central
station generation also loom larger today than ten years ago. An
acceptable method for the permanent disposal of high level nuclear
wastes has proven stubbornly elusive.2 The partial meltdown at
Three Mile Island revealed flaws in the fundamental assumptions
of reactor licensing while reminding everyone that the possibility
of a reactor accident with catastrophic consequences is a continu-
ing reality.33 The effects of exposure to low level radiation remain a
electricity price increases are "elastic" and, hence, that "some utilities may see absolute
declines in sales of kilowatt hours, and reduced revenue measured in real, deflated dollars."
Chapman & Mount, Electricity Demand and the Financial Problems of Electric Utilities,
in CORNELL UNIV. DEP'T OF AGRIC. ECON. STAFF PAPER No. 74-25, at 11 (1974). The experi-
ence of the Consolidated Edison Co. (Con Ed) bears out this warning. Rate hikes and
sharply rising fuel costs combined to more than double the average householder's electricity
bill between 1971 and 1974. The company's sales declined and revenues were inadequate to
finance its ongoing construction program. Bankruptcy was averted only by the intervention
of the New York State Legislature, which authorized the Power Authority of the State of
New York to purchase from Con Ed, for $612 million, two generating units then under con-
struction which the company could no longer afford to complete. See CONSOLIDATED EDISON
Co. oF N.Y., 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1976). The company's rates remain relatively high,
however, and have been responsible for the relocation of some energy intensive business
from the company's service territory. Recently, in an effort to halt this exodus, the company
proposed what it called an "Area Development Credit" (others, less charitably dubbed it a
"corporate lifeline"). Essentially, the credit grants a reduced rate for industrial customers
who are heavily dependent upon electricity and are encountering economic difficulties. Con-
cluding that the proposed "credit" was not targeted with sufficient precision, the New York
Public Service Commission declined to approve it. At the same time, the PSC acknowledged
its continuing concern for Con Ed's future, and applauded the company for at least "realiz-
ing that creative approaches must be initiated to deal with economic forces that pose a great
financial threat to those customers who possess neither the mobility nor the economic re-
sources to find an alternative to the Con Ed system." In re Consolidated Edison Co.,
NYPSC Opinion No. 79-4 at 9 (Mar. 6, 1979).
32. See generally, Nuclear Waste Management, 32 S.C.L. REV. 639 (1981); Symposium
on the Management of Nuclear Wastes, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 693 (1981); Note, Radioac-
tive Waste Management, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 259 (1981). The NRC continues to
"study" the problem in the "Waste Confidence" proceeding, a rulemaking initiative begun
in 1979 but still far from completion. See Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Wastes, 44 Fed.
Reg. 61372 (Oct. 25, 1979); Potomac Alliance v. NRC, 682 F.2d 1030, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 443 (1982) (vacating NRC rule for assessing the environmental impact of long-
term storage of high level nuclear waste).
33. See, e.g., Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969: Statement of Interim Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 40,101 (June 13,
1980) (announcing that environmental impact statements issued by the NRC in connection
with a proposal to license a nuclear power plant would henceforward include a discussion of
the environmental consequences of reactor accidents involving major radiation releases);
Pratt, Catastrophic Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents: An Issue of Safety, A Question of
Record, 14 GA. L. REv. 265 (1980) (concluding that insufficient consideration has been given
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subject of debate,34 acid rain continues to sterilize our lakes and
streams,35 and atmospheric accumulation of carbon dioxide jeopar-
dizes the very life support systems of the earth.36
There is also a new concern. Further capacity expansion risks
a commitment to bulk power systems (generating stations together
with their associated network of transmission lines) which may be
irreversible. Some have suggested that such a commitment will
lead inevitably to a future of plutonium-fueled breeder reactors. 7
Others, who believe such fears to be exaggerated, nevertheless ac-
knowledge that continued expansion of bulk power systems does at
least threaten to stultify newly emerging energy supply options, in-
cluding conservation measures and small scale decentralized en-
ergy sources.38  The development of these alternative energy
sources may be thwarted in two ways: 1) The capital needed to
realize their potential could be forfeited to the staggering capital
requirements of the industry's bulk power expansion plans; and 2)
even if the capital needed to finance alternative sources remains
available, the revenue required to cover the costs of bulk power
expansion might make it politically intolerable to permit consum-
ers to invest in these alternatives and withdraw from the bulk
power system.3 9
to the likelihood and consequences of a catastrophic nuclear reactor accident). A recent
NRC study concludes that the "worst case" death toll for a severe reactor accident could
surpass 100,000 and the damage from such an accident could exceed $300 billion. See 10
ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 1104-05 (Sept. 30, 1982).
34. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROBLEMS IN ASSESSING THE CANCER RISKS
oF Low LEVEL IONIZING RADIATION EXPOSURE (1980).
35. 10 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALIrY, ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY: THE TENTH ANNUAL RE-
PORT 70-71 (1979) ("Acid rain is recognized as one of the two most serious global environ-
mental problems associated with fossil fuel combustion. . ."). In 1980, Congress created the
Acid Precipitation Task Force and charged it with the responsibility of making available
further information about the sources, formation, transport, effects and possible control of
acid rain. See Acid Precipitation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 770-75 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 8901 (1980)). While studies continue, the problem grows worse. See generally
12 COuNCIL ON ENrL. QuALrrY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT,
45-48, 192 (1982).
36. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON EqvTL. QUALITY, GLOBAL ENERGY FUTURES AND THE CARBON
DIOXIDE PROBLEM (1981); SAYRE, VALUES IN THE ELECTRIC PowER INDUSTRY (1977); Sullivan,
Increased Burning of Fuels Could Alter Climate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1979, at C1, cols. 3-
5.
37. See B. COMMONER, THE POLITICS OF ENERGY (1979).
38. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
39. See LOvINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE 59-60 (1977); but see
Rossin, The Hidden Costs of Soft Energy, 6 EPA J. 32 (1980). In the view of the Environ-
1983] 229
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B. The Continuing Need for Regulation of Capacity Expansion
The societal interest in the expansion plans of the nation's
electric utilities is thus clear; whether governmental intervention is
required to protect that interest is not so obvious. Under perfect
competition there are, of course, no incentives for producers to in-
vest "too much" capital in a plant; overexpansion would simply
cause a decline in profits. The economics of electricity supply, how-
ever, are very different. Rate regulation and the federal tax laws
may operate to provide electric utilities with financial incentives to
overestimate future demand. At the same time, the companies are
protected by regulation from the risks of overexpansion.
1. Rate regulation and the tax laws: Stimulants to over-
expansion. Under traditional rate regulation, utilities are allowed
revenues supposedly sufficient to enable them to recover their
costs of service and to earn a reasonable return on their invest-
ment.4 0 In theory, a reduction in costs does not automatically re-
sult in greater profits; these flow only from an increase in the com-
pany's rate base (its total invested capital) or an increase in its
allowed rate of return.4' From this, some economists have inferred
that utilites are "biased" in favor of capital investments, favoring
rate base maximization over cost minimization.42 Others have ar-
mental Defense Fund, which favors increased investment in conservation and small scale
renewable energy sources over the conventional (coal-fired) capacity expansion plans of Cal-
ifornia's electric utilities, "you can't have both the [new coal] plant and conservation. And
conservation is cheaper." Leydet, Coal vs. Parklands, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Dec. 1980, at 776-
803. For a similar view, see NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., STAFF POSITION PAPER ON
ELECTRIC GENERATION PLANNING, 63-66 (1979). See also Feder, Seal-Kap Cuts Loose from
Con Ed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1980, § 3, at 4, col. 1 (reporting efforts by Con Ed to squelch
the development of small-scale cogeneration in its service territory because, inter alia, it
"drives up the cost of supplying electricity to other customers").
40. See generally 1 A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 20-54.
41. In reality, a reduction in operating costs can lead to greater profits because of "reg-
ulatory lag." A company's revenue requirement is determined on the basis of costs and reve-
nues which are forecast for the "rate year." If actual costs are below those forecast, and
revenues materialize as projected, earnings will exceed those allowed. This has not happened
very often recently because PUCs traditionally have based forecast costs on historical costs,
and inflation has tended to assure that actual costs incurred in the rate year will be greater
than those forecast, resulting in lower earnings than those theoretically allowed. One regula-
tory response to this problem of "earnings erosion" has been the increased use of forecast
rather than historical operations as the basis for fixing rates. See, e.g., NEW YORK PUB. SERV.
COMM'N, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON TEST PERIODS IN MAJOR RATE PROCEEDINGS 3 (1977).
42. The seminal works are Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REv. 1052 (1962), and Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipe-
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gued that any such bias (known as the "A-J-W effect") is more
theoretical than real,43 but ample evidence confirming its influence
on electric utility investment priorities can be found in many of
the industry's practices." These practices include the industry's
notorious refusal to achieve lower production costs through inter-
connection, wheeling, pooling and other efforts at system coordina-
tion;45 its maintenance of unnecessarily large capacity reserves; 4
line Companies: An Economic Analysis, 71 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1963). See also Johnson, The
Averch-Johnson Hypothesis After Ten Years, in REGULATION IN FURTHER PERSPECTIVE: THE
LI ET ENGINE THAT MIGHT 67 (W. Shepherd & T. Geis ed. 1974); E. BERLIN, C. CIccsrn
& W. GILLEN, PERSPECTIVE ON POWER 60-64 (1974).
43. See, e.g. KAHN, supra note 9, at 106-07 (agreeing that "the 'A-J-W effect'. . . un-
doubtedly describes a real tendency," but arguing that it is overcome by "offsetting forces,"
id. at 50); Corey, The Averch and Johnson Proposition: A Critical Analysis, 2 BELL J. 358
(1971). Of course, even in theory the A-J-W effect should disappear when the regulated
firm's cost of capital exceeds its real (after tax) rate of return; see KAHN, supra note 9, at 56.
44. See, e.g., Spann, Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An Em-
pirical Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J. 38 (1974); Courville, Regulation and
Efficiency in the Electric Utiltity Industry, 5 BELL J. 53 (1974); Peterson, An Empirical
Test of Regulatory Effects, 6 BELL J. 111 (1975).*
45. The industry's preference for construction over coordination has been well docu-
mented. See Breyer & MacAvoy, The Federal Power Commission and the Coordination
Problem in the Electric Power Industry, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 661 (1973). Writing ten years
after the FPC had estimated that the industry's failure to better coordinate bulk power
supply cost consumers between one and two billion dollars a year, the authors observed that
the coordination problem remained "serious." Curiously, while they acknowledged that the
A-J-W hypothesis might explain the industry's intransigence, they concluded that it was
caused by other, more subtle, factors. Id. at 686-94. For the view that the A-J-W effect was
implicated, see Shepherd, Utility Growth and Profits Under Regulation, in UTILrrY REGU-
LATION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND POLICY 12, 51-53 (W. Shepherd & T. Geis ed.
1966). The problem has lingered and recently has been addressed by Congress, with legisla-
tion increasing the authority of the federal government to require individual utilities to es-
tablish transmission interconnections and to wheel power. See Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, §§ 210-11, 92 Stat. 3117, 3135-36, (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 824i-824j (Supp. IV. 1980)). See also In re Empire State Power Resources, Inc.,
NYPSC Opinion No. 79-10 (Apr. 12, 1979)(Chairman Zielinski, concurring). The opinion
critcizes refusal of the New York power companies to reduce the costs of planning, con-
structing and operating new generating facilities through formation of a statewide service
company. The companies had instead sought PSC approval of "ESPRI," a far more capital-
intensive scheme for reducing new capacity costs.
46. Most bulk power systems have been designed to assure that the probability of a
"loss of load" would not exceed one day in every ten years; see FEDE L POWER COMM'N,
THE 1970 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY, pt. H1, ch. 5 (1970); NEW YORK POWER POOL, GENERA-
TION RELIABILITY AND RESERVE REQUIREMENTs 2 (1972). The New York Power Pool has a
self-imposed reliability criterion which "presumes that there will be actual customer discon-
nections of a fairly limited duration no more frequently than once in every 100 years." See
In re Long Range Electric Plans, 16 NYPSC 1025, 1031 (pt. HI 1976) (emphasis added).
The individual companies generally have been expected to maintain a generating reserve of
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its preference for nuclear over coal-fired generation;47 its initial re-
sistance to peak load pricing and other load management tech-
niques;48 and, most recently, its continuing failure to explore the
system savings which might accrue from the installation of smaller
generating units.49
This bias in favor of capital investment is further intensified
by the federal tax laws; indeed, the effect of these laws on electric
utility capacity expansion can be dramatic. An investment in ex-
cess of one billion dollars for a new power plant provides its owner
with a large income tax deduction for interest expense 0 and a
large investment tax credit.5 1 Even after the plant has been built,
the company's investment continues to be the source of a large de-
duction through accelerated depreciation. 52 Taken together, these
deductions and credits associated with new and existing plants can
operate to shelter much of a utility's income from taxation; in
about 20% of their peak loads; see, e.g., FEDERAL POWER COMM'N, THE 1970 NATIONAL
POWER SURVEY, supra. As a result of both past load growth and new capacity costs, these
reserves have become extraordinarily expensive, prompting the New York PSC to observe
that "consumers are being asked to pay for a higher degree of reliability than has been
demonstrated to be economic." See In re Long Range Electric Plans, 16 Op. NYPSC at
1031. Unchastened, the New York Power Pool subsequently concluded that its reserve mar-
gin should be increased from 22% to 23% simply to enable it to continue to meet its "one
day in ten year" loss of load probability criterion. See 1 NEw YORK POWER POOL, REPORT OF
MEMBER ELECTIC SYSTEMS 333 (1978). In 1979, however, the Pool altered the basis for eval-
uating its generating reliability to incorporate consideration of the impact of emergency pro-
cedures regularly followed by electric system operators confronted by capacity deficiencies.
This change returned the Pool's required reserve margin to 22%, which it claims is cost
justified; see 2 NEw YORK POWER POOL, REPORT OF MEMBER ELECTRIC SYSTEMS 59-64 (1979).
This margin presently requires the New York companies to maintain an aggregate generat-
ing reserve of about 4,000 Mw.
47. Most analyses have concluded that nuclear power no longer enjoys any economic
advantage over coal-fired generation; see generally Bupp, The Nuclear Stalemate, in EN-
ERGY FUTURE, supra note 3, at 108-35. The industry's claim to the contrary has met with
increasing skepticism. Wisconsin has barred further nuclear expansion in order to avoid eco-
nomic catastrophe; see In re Advance Plans for Construction of Facilities, NUCLEAR REG.
REP. (CCH) 1 20,093 (Wisc. PSC, Aug. 17, 1978).
48. See KAHN, supra note 9, at 50 & n.10.
49. See Boyd & Thompson, The Effect of Demand Uncertainty on the Relative Eco-
nomics of Electrical Generation Technologies with Differing Lead Times, 4 ENERGY SYS. &
POL'Y J. 99 (1980); In re Long Range Electric Plans, NYPSC Opinion No. 78-3, at 6-7 (Mar.
6, 1978) ("Given the uncertainties about long range demand for electricity ... it is at least
conceivable that it would make more sense to be planning several small plant additions,.
rather than a single, large base-load facility").
50. 26 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
51. Id. §38.
52. Id. § 167.
1983] REGULATING POWER PRODUCTION
many cases they are large enough to offset wholly a company's
nominal 46% tax rate53 The tax code thus provides the utilities
with powerful incentives to construct a new plant and then to re-
tire it from service, regardless of whether such construction or re-
tirement is otherwise economically prudent. 4
2. "Used and Useful". A failed constraint. Notwithstanding
these incentives for overinvestment, utilities always have claimed
that capacity planning was cost justified 55 and that overexpansion
is effectively constrained by traditional rate regulation which per-
mits a utility to earn a return only on investment in a plant which
is "used and useful."' A power plant that was not needed would
not satisfy this condition, would not be included in a utility's rate
base, 57 and thus, from a stockholder's point of view, would re-
53. See Davis, Federal Tax Subsidies For Electric Utilities: An Energy Policy Per-
spective, 4 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 311 (1980). In 1974, when the federal investment tax credit
was only 4%, the net income before taxes of the seven investor-owned utilities in New York
was $478 million. Their effective tax rate-as opposed to the statutory rate of 46%-was
eight tenths of one percent. STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION BOARD PETITION TO NYPSC FOR A
GENERIC PROCEEDING ON THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF NUCLEAR PowER 20-22 (1976). Nationwide,
investor owned utilities in 1975 paid an average aggregate of less than 2% of their operating
revenues in federal income taxes, "a significant number" paid no federal income taxes at all,
and "many actually received tax refunds from the Federal treasury." See APPA Comments
on the National Power Grid Study, in THE NATIONAL PowER GRID STUDY, supra note 6, at 4
(1980).
54. See Davis, supra note 53.
55. See, e.g., Long Range Planning Reports, filed annually since 1973 by the member
systems of the New York Power Pool, pursuant to N.Y. PuB. SEav. LAW § 149(b) (McKinney
1982), and N.Y. ENERGY LAW §§ 5-112 (McKinney 1982).
56. See generally 2 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 142-77
(1969). For recent applications of the "used and useful" rule, see Office of Consumers' Coun-
sel v. Ohio PUC, 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 167-68, 423 N.E.2d 820, 829 (1981), app. dismissed, 455
U.S. 914 (1982); see also In re Jersey Central Power and Light Co., 85 N.J. 520, 428 A.2d
498 (1981) (upholding exclusion of T.M.L-1 from rate base because of outage of indefinite
duration); City of Cleveland v. Public Utilities Conm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 62, 406 N.E.2d 1370
(1980). In In re Metropolitan Edison Co. & Pa. Elec. Co., NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) %
20,160 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, May 23, 1980); In In re Attorney Gen. v. Michigan Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 412 Mich. 385, 316 N.W.2d 187 (1982), the court's holding-that the Michi-
gan PSC lacked the statutory authority to consider the need for a new powerplant on a
utility's application for approval to issue securities-was expressly premised on the assump-
tion that a facility which was not needed could not be included in the utility's rate base, and
that the risk of excess capacity thereby remained with the company's investors rather than
its ratepayers.
57. Cf. City of Cleveland v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 62, 406 N.E.2d
at 1270 (upholding decision of Ohio PUC to include Cleveland Electric's $306 million invest-
ment in the Davis Besse Nuclear Generating Station in the company's rate base even
though the new plant's capacity was not required to meet reserve margins, but only because
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present a billion dollar white elephant. Why then, the companies
ask, would utility management intentionally invest in excess capac-
ity? In theory, they would not,5" but in reality they do because reg-
ulation actually operates to insulate shareholders from the theoret-
ical risks of overexpansion.
First, exceptions to the "used and useful" rule have arisen be-
cause of the economic realities of modern day power plant con-
struction; new power plants cost too much and take too long to
complete for a typical utility to forego all return on its investment
in a new facility until it is brought into service. From the moment
a company first incurs expenses in connection with the construc-
tion of a new generating station, it will receive, at the very least, an
allowance for funds used during construction, known as AFC.59
While this is a noncash allowance, AFC immediately increases a
company's net income and earnings, and ultimately shifts the car-
rying costs of construction from the company's stockholders to its
future ratepayers6 0 Of course, the augmentation of income by a
mere book entry will not suffice when a utility is hard pressed for
cash, and this is a particularly commonplace condition for utilities
endeavoring to finance expansion. In these circumstances it has be-
come common for rateregulators to allow a company's rate base to
include not only a plant which is used and useful, but construction
work in progress (CWIP) as well."1 The effect of this accounting
generation from the plant had reduced overall system production costs and thereby led to
lower rates).
58. But see Maher, The Dynamics of Growth in the Electric Power Industry, in VAL-
uRs IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (K. Sayre ed. 1977) (arguing that electric utilities will
invest in excess capacity because "growth" rather than "profit maximization" is the para-
mount decision criterion of management).
59. See generally J. SUEFLOW, PUBLIC UTILITY ACCOUNTING: THEORY AND APPLICATION
(1973). There is, of course, nothing improper about an allowance for AFC. When a lengthy,
expensive construction project is undertaken, a company uses funds from a variety of
sources. Some funds may be raised "externally" by the sale of debt securities; some may be
raised "internally" from retained earnings. When funds are raised externally, actual interest
charges are incurred and these charges are capitalized as a cost of construction. Although no
actual interest charges are incurred on equity capital, such funds do remain unproductive
during the construction period and, in a sense, the return foregone during this period is also
a cost of construction. This cost is called AFC and is capitalized, as are other construction
costs. Id. at 178-80.
60. These carrying costs can be enormous for a new power plant. For example, it has
been estimated that a reduction in the construction period of the Shoreham Nuclear Gener-
ating Station, an 820 Mw facility being built by the Long Island Lighting Co., will save
carrying charges of $300,000 per day. NEW YORK PSC, PRESS RELEASE No. 78246 (1978).
61. See, e.g., Cohalon v. Gioia, 88 A.D.2d 722, 451 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1982) (two hundred
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legerdemain is to provide the company with an immediate cash re-
turn on its investment in a new plant, thus shifting the carrying
costs of new construction from the company's stockholders to its
current ratepayers.2 Any deterrent to overexpansion which results
from having these costs borne by stockholders is, of course, lost in
the bargain.
Secondly, even when state rateregulators purport to apply the
"used and useful" rule, they cannot rigorously administer it since
million dollar CWIP added to rate base to enable completion of nuclear generating unit).
According to a report recently issued by the General Accounting Office, as of April, 1979,
thirty-three PUCs had allowed CWIP to be included in rates. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PROGRESS ISSUE NEEDS IMPROVED REGULATORY RESPONSE
FOR UTILITIES AND CONSUMERS (1980).
In the exercise of its jurisdiction over wholesale sales of electricity in interstate com-
merce, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has allowed a utility to include
CWIP in its rate base only with respect to pollution control or coal conversion projects, or in
cases of "severe financial difficulty," a vague term which the FERC has not yet had the
opportunity to amplify by decision. In one case now pending, an administrative law judge
has recommended that the Public Service Co. of New Hampshire be allowed to include the
ongoing construction costs of its Seabrook Nuclear Generating Station in its wholesale rate
base because the company would otherwise be unable "to generate sufficient cash to meet its
cash obligations, including interest on its debt and dividends on its stock." See PUB. SERV.
CO. OF N.H., No. EL 78-15 (Initial Decision, Jan. 26, 1979). Since this type of cash flow
problem is today commonplace among utilities attempting to finance ambitious construction
programs, if this decison is upheld it will mean that the "severe financial difficulty" test can
be met rather readily. A determination by FERC is now anticipated in the context of a
rulemaking proceeding, see Construction Work In Progress For Public Utilities, 46 Fed.
Reg. 3944 (Aug. 3, 1981) and 47 Fed. Reg. 1676 (Jan. 13, 1982). See also Hobelman, Knapp
& Walsh, Construction Work In Progress For Electric Utilities: A Compendium of Com-
ments Presented To The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission In Docket No. Rm. 81-83,
277 PRAC. L. INST. 65 (1980).
62. Arguably, the inclusion of CWIP in a company's rate base may be of benefit to
ratepayers too, at least in the long run. First, AFC would not be charged with CWIP in-
cluded in the rate base. Second, the inclusion of CWIP in rate base results in improved cash
earnings which, in turn, may enable the company to finance the remainder of construction
at lower costs. In either case, the company's rate base in the future (after the plant goes into
service) would be commensurately reduced. Future ratepayers (a class perhaps roughly con-
terminous with current ratepayers) would thus incur a smaller revenue obligation with re-
spect to the plant. It is clear, however, that current ratepayers remain unwilling to bear the
immediate costs of CWIP, notwithstanding this promise of future benefits. See In re Niag-
ara Mohawk Corp., 16 Op. NYPSC 914, 914-16 (1976). Indeed, Meldrim Thompson lost the
govenorship of New Hampshire when he proposed that the ongoing construction costs of the
controversial Seabrook Nuclear Generating Station be included in its owner's rate base. The
New Hampshire Legislature subsequently prohibited that accounting procedure. See D.
STEVER JR., SEABROOK AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 111-32 (1980). In most
states, however, rate making treatment of CWIP remains within the regulatory discretion of
a PUC. See, e.g., Cohalon v. Gioia, 88 A.D.2d 722, 451 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1982); Consumer Pro-
tection Bd. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 78 A.D.2d 65, 434 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1980).
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the exclusion of a billion dollar facility from a utility's rate base is
likely to devastate its financial condition. 3 Overexpansion thus
leaves public utility commissions (PUCs) facing a dilemma: If sur-
plus capacity is included in a company's rate base, consumers will
be charged for a plant from which they receive no benefit; on the
other hand, if the new plant is excluded from the rate base, AFC
charges will continue to accumulate, the company's earnings will
deteriorate, its cost for the capital needed to provide continuing
service will increase, and consumers once again will face higher
rates.
The problem is well illustratated by the history of the $220
million oil-fired plant known as Oswego No. 4, which was brought
into service by the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation in Febru-
ary, 1976.64 At the time, the company already had substantial ex-
cess capacity, and installation of the new unit increased its gener-
ating reserve to 47%, well above the company's 18% reserve
margin requirement. e5 Moreover, while the running costs of the
plant were lower than those of older, oil-fired plants within the
company's system, the new unit could not be justified economically
since its high fixed costs raised total production costs above those
of the company's existing capacity.66 Consumers therefore chal-
lenged the company's decision to bring the unit into service, and
urged that the plant be excluded from the company's rate base.
The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) acknowl-
edged the "conceptual attractiveness"'67 of continuing to accrue
AFC while excluding the new unit from the company's rate base
and thereby allocating the costs of carrying excess capacity to the
future customers it might serve. Nevertheless, the PSC rejected
this solution because it would have resulted in the company receiv-
63. See, e.g., In re Jersey Cent'l Power & Light Co., 85 N.J. 520, 428 A.2d 498 (1981).
There, to offset decrease in revenues of $17.9 million caused by removal of TMI-1 from rate
base, the New Jersey PUC ordered that recovery of the company's deferred energy account
be accelerated in an equivalent amount. See also Jones, An Example of a Regulatory Alter-
native to Antitrust: New York Utilities in the Early Seventies, 73 COLuM. L. REV. 462, 481
(1973) (rate base exclusion as a sanction "more theoretical than real"). But see In re Metro-
politan Edison Co., Pa. PUC Opinion No. 1-79040308, at 468 (June 15, 1979) (expressing
skepticism about the risk of bankruptcy for General Public Utilities Corp. incident to re-
moval of TMI-2 from rate base).
64. In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 16 Op. NYPSC 911 (Nov. 16, 1976).
65. Id. at 924.
66. Id. at 924-25.
67. Id. at 925.
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ing cash earnings insufficient to finance its ongoing construction
program.68 Another 850 Mw oil-fired unit, Oswego No. 6, was then
scheduled for service in 1980, and an 1,100 Mw nuclear unit was
scheduled for addition to the company's system in 1982.69 Financ-
ing these projects had already resulted in large AFC (noncash)
earnings, and it was feared that a further increase in the com-
pany's ratio of AFC-to-cash earnings might lead to an increase in
the company's cost of capital and, consequently, to higher rates for
future ratepayers. The new unit was therefore included in the com-
pany's rate base. While this solution was supposedly in the long-
run best interests of the company's ratepayers,7 0 it presents the ap-
pearance of a "catch-22" by requiring ratepayers to pay for past
overexpansion so that further expansion might continue
uninterrupted.
Under these circumstances, the "used and useful" rule actu-
ally may operate to promote overexpansion. Commitments to new
generating stations must be made ten to sixteen years in advance,
on the basis of load and capacity projections made with considera-
ble uncertainty. This uncertainty diminishes as the target year ap-
proaches, but by that time millions of dollars have already been
invested in site acquisition, site preparation, engineering and, per-
haps, construction. Under the "used and useful" rule, these ex-
penses are capitalized and will earn no return until the plant goes
into service. Thus, even if new projections suggest that new gener-
ating capacity will not be needed as soon as originally had been
thought, utility management nevertheless may be tempted to ig-
nore the new projections and complete the facility before it is
needed.7'
68. Id.
69. Id. at 929.
70. Id.
71. In such cases, it has become commonplace for the companies to endeavor to justify
this "early" addition of new capacity by claiming that energy from the new plant (whether
nuclear or coal-fired) will be more economical than energy from existing oil-fired facilities.
See, e.g., 2 NEW YORK POWER POOL, REPORT OF MEMBER ELECTRIC SYSTEMS 4-8 (1979). On
close examination these claims often have been found unpersuasive. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 117-22. Of course, the deferral or cancellation of scheduled plants sometimes
cannot be avoided, particularily when pressing cash problems are present. See, e.g., In re
Detroit Edison Co., NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) T 20,035 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, July 26,
1976). Under traditional accounting procedures the costs of deferral will be paid by future
ratepayers through allowances for AFC. Investment in a cancelled project also will be
recouped from ratepayers, at least where it cannot be said that the original undertaking was
1983]
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Adding to this temptation to throw good money after bad is
the knowledge that the additional outlay required to complete the
plants only makes it more difficult for the sanction of rate base
exclusion to be employed. Clearly, the sanction may be threatened,
but the utility companies have learned that such threats are
empty. Thus, in a virtual replay of its 1976 rate treatment of Os-
wego No. 5, the New York PSC later permitted Niagara Mohawk
to begin earning a return on yet another generating unit, Oswego
No. 6, even though this plant was also brought into service long
before it was needed. 2
Obviously, once the investment in capacity expansion has been
made, rateregulators simply are left with too little room in which
to maneuver. s As a result, much of today's rate regulation appears
to be a classic case of locking the barn door after the horse has
been stolen. Constrained by the imperatives of the capital markets,
the PUCs too often simply have no alternative but to grant a rate
award which augments utility earnings.74 Their discretion lies not
in deciding whether to grant a rate increase, but rather in choosing
the accounting technique by which an unavoidable rate increase
can be effectuated. Accordingly, the "used and useful" rule, admin-
istered in the context of traditional rate regulation, cannot operate
as an effective deterrent to overexpansion.
imprudent. Id.; see also In re Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp., NYPSC Opinion No. 82-1 at
15 (Jan. 12, 1982). But see Office of Consumer's Counsel v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n: Who Shall
Bear The Cost Of Abandonment, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 91 (1981).
72. See In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., NYPSC Opinion No. 80-7 at 44-45 (Feb.
29, 1980).
73. Imaginative regulation sometimes may make the burden of excess capacity easier to
bear. For example, while the New York PSC felt constrained to include Niagara Mohawk's
$220 million investment in Oswego No. 5 in the company's rate base even before the capac-
ity from this unit was needed on the company's system, it sought to soften the impact of full
recognition of the facility in the company's rates by "imputing" to the company 1% more
sales ($6,750,000 in revenues) during the rate year than the company had projected. Since
the total revenue requirement associated with the plant was about $21,500,000, this required
current ratepayers to supply only $14,750,000 ($21,500,000 less $6,750,000), and shifted to
the company's stockholders the risk that the imputed sales ($6,750,000) would not material-
ize. While the PSC described this unequal sharing of the costs of excess capacity as "equita-
ble," it should be noted that the accounting artifice employed-the imputation of more sales
than the company had predicted for the rate year-provided the company with an incentive
to promote sales rather than conservation, and thus conflicted with other important regula-
tory objectives. See In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 16 Op. NYPSC 924-26 (Nov. 16,
1976).
74. Thus, for example, the construction of the Shoreham plant has led to five major
rate increases for Long Island Lighting Co. in just six years; see supra note 28.
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II. THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Basic Approach and Its Failure
Many states require some demonstration of "need" before a
new power plant may be built.7 5 In some states this showing must
be made to a PUC on an application for a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity;7 6 in others it is made to an agency which
administers a power plant siting law." In addition, where a nuclear
or hydroelectric unit is proposed, "need" determinations are also
made either by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 8 In essence, the
approach taken by these many different agencies is essentially the
same: 1) A decision to add new generating capacity is initially
made by company management. 2) An application for approval is
then submitted to the appropriate state and federal agencies. In
this application, the social desirability of the proposed facility is
alleged to be a "need" for additional power, supposedly established
by the company's ten to twenty year forecasts of its energy and
capacity requirements. 3) Other forecasts, differing widely from the
company's, are subsequently offered by opponents of the proposed
expansion. 4) The governmental decision maker must choose from
among these competing views of the distant future, which it does
only after what purports to be a rigorous analysis, often involving
cross-examination and other trial-type procedures.
At first glance, this approach might appear to be adequate; at
the very least it is traditional. Substantively, it continues the regu-
latory tradition of leaving investment initiatives to the private sec-
75. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE NEED FOR POWER AND THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLO-
GIEs: STATE DECISIONS ON ELECTRIC POWER FACILITIES 5-8 (1981) (thirty-eight states require
certification of power plants, which generally requires some demonstration of need. Dela-
ware requires a certification, but determines need by its rate and general supervisory pow-
ers. Fifteen states also use financial approvals as a means of need for power review. Twenty-
three states also make a need for power determination during rate approval. Only five states
do not determine need at all: Georgia, Indiana, South Dakota, Rhode Island, Oklahoma).
76. Id.
77. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRICITY PLANNING--TODAY'S IM-
PROVEMENTS CAN ALTER TOMORROW'S INVESTMENT DECISIONS 20-24, 115-26 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ELECTRICITY PLANNING]; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, IMPROVING REGULATORY
EFFECTIVENESS IN FEDERAL/STATE SITING ACTIONS 5-7 (1977).
78. See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,
Unit 2), 1 N.R.C. 347, 352-72 (1975); In re Appalachian Power Co. (Blue Ridge Project), 5
PUR 4th 334, 346-47 (FPC 1974), aff'd sub nom. State of North Carolina v. FPC, 533 F.2d
702 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 891 (1976).
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tor, reserving only a reactive role for the public regulator.70 Proce-
durally, it incorporates the familiar decision-making process of
adversary adjudication. Despite these traditional features-indeed,
perhaps because of them-the current approach to government
regulation of electric utility capacity expansion, when judged by its
results, has had little success. Excess generating capacity exists in
most areas of the country, yet the nation's utilities continue to
pursue ambitious plans for further expansion.80 At the same time,
investments which could produce more energy less expensively are
simply not being made. l The Council on Environmental Quality,
for example, has estimated that a "strong, sustained commitment"
to conservation could obviate the need for 425 of 561 large coal and
nuclear power plants by the year 2000.2 Similarly, the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, examining a proposal by Pacific Gas and
Electric Company to double its installed capacity by the year 2000
(with three-fourths of this expansion coming from ten new coal
and nuclear units), concluded that everyone (including the utility's
stockholders) would be better off with a plan under which 90% of
the company's planned coal and nuclear expansion is displaced by
investments in conservation and alternative energy sources.8 3 In-
79. The essence of this tradition is summed up by a well-known aphorism: "Manage-
ment proposes and the commission disposes." See KAHN, supra note 9, at 47; BERLIN;
CxccHErrI, & GILLEN, supra note 11, at 53.
80. For example, in 1979 the New York utilities had 4,300 Mw (20%) of "excess" capac-
ity-that is, installed capacity even beyond a 22% reserve-yet proposed a fifteen year gen-
eration expansion plan calling for the construction of more than 12,000 Mw of new capacity,
requiring more than $18 billion in capital outlays. See 2 NEW YORK POWER POOL, REPORT
OF MEMBER ELECTRIC SYSTEMS 1-6 (1979). Nationwide, while surplus generating capacity
also approached 20%, the utility industry continued to forecast capacity deficiences requir-
ing the addition of 233,500 Mw of new generating capacity by 1989, at an estimated cost of
$333 billion. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR THE
CONTIGUOUS UNITED STATES 1980-1989, 1-2 (1980). The Environmental Action Foundation, a
consumer group, claims that of one hundred companies it surveyed, seventy-eight had more
capacity than needed. See ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOUND., POWER LINE 4 (Jan. 1978).
81. See generally ELECTRICITY PLANNING, supra note 77; CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMM'N,
ENERGY CHOICES FOR CALIFORNIA-LoOKING AHEAD (1979); NEW YORK STATE ENERGY OF.
FICE, STATE ENERGY MASTER PLAN AND LONG-RANGE ELECTRIC AND GAS REPORT (draft rep.
1979). See also In re Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Cal. PUC Opinion D.89316, at 48-61
(Sept. 6, 1978) (criticizing company for failure to invest in conservation and alternative en-
ergy sources); In re Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Cal. PUC Opinion D.91107, at 180-86 (Dec.
19, 1979) (penalizing company for failure to invest in cogeneration).
82. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT ENERGY 19-27 (1979).
83. See generally WILLEY, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SYSTEMS FOR PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC
Co.: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1978). On the basis of this study, the California Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) is opposing an application by Pacific Gas and Electric to the Califor-
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deed, the economic efficiency of these nonconventional investments
may warrant, in some cases, the actual abandonment and write-off
of ongoing power plant construction projects."" Despite all this,
central station expansion continues.
Adding insult to injury, the regulatory process itself has
proven cumbersome and costly, wasting a great deal of time, effort
and money. Litigation before the NRC concerning the need for a
nuclear facility usually involves lengthy hearings85 and often dupli-
cative state proceedings. A 1974 proposal to build an 1,150 Mw nu-
clear unit in- upstate New York, for example, triggered two pro-
ceedings: one before the NRC and the other before the New York
State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment.
The NRC proceeding was typical, involving more than twenty days
nia PUC for permission to participate in the Allen-Warner Valley Project, a 2,500 Mw coal-
fired complex planned to be built in wilderness areas of Utah and Nevada. EDF contends
that the California utility could develop the equivalent capacity from alternative sources,
such as geothermal steam, wind turbines and cogeneration, at a savings of $500 million. See
Can Soft Energy Save Hard Cash?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1980, at A26, cols. 1-2; see also
Leydet, Coal vs. Parklands, 158 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 777 (Dec. 1980). While the company
initially disputed the EDF study, it has recently announced a change in its "overall resource
plans," consisting of a reduction in the size of the Allen-Warner Valley Project and an in-
creased commitment to a number of residential and commercial conservation programs. See
California Utilities Reassess Role in Allen-Warner Electricity Project, ENERGY USERS REP.
(BNA) No. 393 at 321 (Feb. 19, 1981).
84. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HYPOTHETICAL TRANSFER OF CONSTRUCTION FUNDS
FROM NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS TO ELECTRICITY CONSERVATION AND RENEWABLE ENERGIES
(April 4, 1980). WNP-4 and WNP-5 were two of five 1,250 Mw nuclear units being built by a
consortium of eighty utilities (including public utility districts, cities and cooperatives) in
the State of Washington. As of March 31, 1980, WNP-4 was 13% complete and WNP-5 was
8% complete, "sunk" construction costs totalled $1.6 billion, and completion was estimated
to cost an additional $4 billion. The GAO concluded that if these funds were instead di-
verted to energy conservation and renewable energy sources, a roughly equivalent amount of
capacity could be available by 1987 at a cost of from $2.9 billion to $3.5 billion (a savings of
from $.5 to $1.1 billion). After further work brought WNP-4 to 24% completion and WNP-5
to 16% completion, the two units were cancelled; see 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 897-98
(Sept. 2, 1982); Olsen, The Washington Public Power Supply System: The Story So Far,
Pus. UTIL. FORT., June 10, 1982, at 15.
A different conclusion has been reached in an analysis of the ongoing construction of the
Shoreham Nuclear Generating Station; see Wold, How the Shoreham Reactor's Costs
Soared, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1980, at B2, cols. 4-6. With the facility 85% complete, and
with $1.7 billion of the plant's estimated $2.2 billion cost already spent, it was recommended
that completion not be delayed pending investigation of an intervenor's claimed "conserva-
tion" alternative. See Proceeding to Investigate the Cost of the Shoreham Nuclear Generat-
ing Facility, NYPSC Opinion No. 27563, at 10 (Levy, A.L.J., 1981).
85. See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,
Unit 2), 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975); see, e.g., EBBIN & KASPER, supra note 15, at 58-90.
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of public hearings before a licensing board which, in 1977, con-
cluded that the proposed plant would be needed in 1984.86 The
state proceeding ran simultaneously; it consumed fifty hearing
days, produced an 8,000 page transcript with 172 documentary ex-
hibits, and culminated in a determination that the proposed plant
was not needed at all."7 A less effective regulatory effort does not
readily come to mind.
B. The Reasons for the Failure of the Basic Approach-The In-
dustry's View
Why has the current approach been such a failure? In the in-
dustry's view, the paradox presented by the need for further ex-
pansion in the face of excess capacity can be explained as an ele-
ment of the "Energy Crisis." Existing capacity, much of it oil-fired,
was planned before the Arab oil embargo and price shocks of 1973-
1974. This extraordinary event caused energy consumption levels
to fall well below those previously forecast, creating a temporary
condition of excess capacity. At the same time, however, it demon-
strated the importance of reducing the nation's dependence upon
imported oil; a goal which could be reached by building new nu-
clear and coal-fired power plants.
The principal problem with this explanation is that it mis-
86. In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit No. 1), 6
N.R.C. 350 (1977).
87. In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. (Sterling Nuclear Power Plant), N.Y. Bd. on
Elec. Generating Siting & the Env't Case No. 80005 (Feb. 11, 1980) [hereinafter N.Y. Bd. on
Elec. GS-E]. Nightmares like the Sterling proceedings are not unique. In 1978, an NRC
licensing board issued a permit for the construction of a two unit nuclear facility at
Jamesport, N.Y., based on its finding that 2,300 Mw of new capacity would be needed by
the middle to late 1980s. Two years later a New York siting agency nullified the NRC con-
struction permit and licensed an 800 Mw coal- fired facility instead, concluding that availa-
ble capacity would be adequate until at least the early 1990s. Compare In re Long Island
Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), 7 N.R.C. 826-77 (1978) with
In re Long Island Lighting Co., N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80003 (Sept. 8, 1980). See
also South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982) (proceeding to
allocate costs arising from the cancellation of a nuclear power plant which the NRC licensed
in December 1977 but which, fifteen months later, the Wisconsin PUC found would not be
needed).
The monetary costs of the process are difficult to calculate. The NRC staff has estimated
that the direct costs to just the NRC and the applicant-utility for consideration of the "need
for power" issue in NRC licensing proceedings ranged from $96,000 to $130,000 per applica-
tion. See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON GENERAL POLICY FOR
RULEMAKING TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING (1978).
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states history. The growth rate of power utilization in many re-
gions had begun to decline even before the 1973-1974 embargo,"
responding to a rise in the price of electricity which started in the
late 1960s. s9 Utility planners were slow to perceive these changes,
primarily because their forecasts of future energy requirements
were made by a process of historical extrapolation--essentialy
the simple extension of a straight line drawn through historical de-
mand values plotted on a piece of log paper for as far into the
future as a forecaster wanted to "see." At the time, there seemed
to be ample justification for this methodology. For decades de-
mand had grown steadily at an annual rate of about 7%, doubling
every ten years, and it was commonly assumed that this trend
would continue.9 1 The deceleration in growth which began in the
early 1970s was thus perceived, perhaps not unreasonably, as a
temporary perturbation brought about by "abnormally mild
weather" or a "business recession," rather than as a change in the
long-term trend."2
Unfortunately, this misperception lingered for far too long.
Even after the "crisis" atmosphere of 1973-1974 triggered dramatic
declines in energy consumption-three successive years of about
2% growth-the industry's forecasters continued to anticipate a
return to historical growth rates, apparently unable to comprehend
slower growth as anything other than a short-term response to an
emergency.9 3 Indeed, if the embargo was to have any lasting ef-
fects, in the industry's view, these would include a marked in-
crease in the demand for electricity relative to other energy
88. See, e.g., Chapman, Tyrell & Mount, Electricity Demand Growth and the Energy
Crisis, 178 Sci. 703 (1972); 1 NEW YORK POWER POOL, REPORT OF MEMBER ELECTRIC CORPO-
RATIONS 1 (1973).
89. See generally Chapman, Electricity Demand and Utility Capacity Planning, in
CORNELL UNIV. DFP'T OF AGRIC. ECON. STAFF PAPER No. 73-17 (1973); Mount & Chapman,
Electricity Demand Projections and Utility Capital Requirements, in CORNELL UNIV. DEP'T
OF AGRIC. ECON. STAFF PAPER No. 74-24 (1974) (presented at the Conf. on Energy Invest-
ment Requirements, Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., Sept. 5, 1974).
90. See, e.g., 1 NEW YORK POWER POOL, REPORT OF MEMBER ELECTRIC CORPORATIONS
intro. 1 (1973); In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit
2), 7 A.E.C. 1046, 1081-82 (1974), afl'd, 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975).
91. See, e.g., FEDERAL POWER COMM'N, THE NATIONAL POWER SURVEY (1970); ATOMIC
ENERGY COMM'N, NUCLEAR POWER 1973-2000 (1972).
92. See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,
Unit 2), 7 A.E.C. at 1066-67.
93. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOUND., POWER LINE (Nov. 1978).
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sources.9 4 Later, when the predicted return to historical growth
rates failed to materialize, it became convenient to blame every-
thing on OPEC. It is apparent, however, that OPEC's action only
accelerated a trend which had begun much earlier.
C. The Reasons for the Failure of the Basic Approach-Another
View
If OPEC is not to blame, who is? While the industry may have
clung too long to outmoded projections of growth, why weren't the
regulators more prescient? Why didn't they refuse to approve the
capacity expansion which has proven so costly? An answer to these
questions requires a closer look at the regulatory process.
First, the regulators never paused to develop criteria for deter-
mining whether there was a social need for new generating capac-
ityY5 Instead, they uncritically adopted the criteria for capacity
planning which had been used by the utilities; the latter, taking
continuous growth as axiomatic, readily derived the corollary that
the demand for electricity should always be met.9 This was, of
course, a classic non sequitur; even if new demand had to be
met-itself a dubious proposition 97-it did not have to be met with
central station capacity.
Unfortunately, this facile equation of "demand" with "need"
led at once to the conclusion that public regulation of capacity ex-
pansion involved nothing more than the evaluation of a utility's
demand forecasts.9 8 While various citizens' groups continued to
challenge proposed power plants on the grounds that growing de-
mand could be met more economically and at less risk to public
health, safety and the environment by a variety of conservation
94. See NATIONAL ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, SEVENTH ANNUAL REVIEW OF OVERALL RE-
LIABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF THE NORTH AMERICAN BULK POWER SYSTEMS (1977).
95. See generally McKim, Social and Environmental Values in Power Plant Licens-
ing: A Study in the Regulation of Nuclear Power, and Goodpaster & Sayre, An Ethical
Analysis of Power Company Decision Making, in VALUES IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY
30, 238 (K. Sayre ed. 1977).
96. See generally Novick, supra note 5; Maher, The Dynamics of Growth In the Elec-
tric Power Industry, in VALUES IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 149 (K. Sayre ed. 1977);
Goodpaster & Sayre, supra note 95.
97. See Murdock, Legal and Economic Aspects of the Electric Utility's 'Mandate to
Serve,' in VALUES IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 100 (K. Sayre ed. 1977).
98. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Power Station),
7 A.E.C. 159, 173 (1974) ("In other words, given the structure of our existing society the
alternative of not meeting real demand is unthinkable").
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measures, load management techniques, and on-site energy
sources, these contentions were simply brushed aside by the regu-
lators.9 As they saw it, with their field of vision conveniently nar-
rowed by the assumption that "demand" and "need" were synony-
mous, the implementation of these alternatives to central station
expansion, however desirable, was simply not their responsibility.
Few acknowledged this view outright. 100 Usually, considerable en-
thusiasm was expressed for the potential role of alternative energy
sources, but in the concrete setting provided by a proceeding to
license a specific increment of generating capacity, it was invaria-
bly concluded that this potential was just too "remote"; either the
"feasibility" of the alternatives had not been adequately demon-
strated, or their impact upon distant demand was "too difficult to
quantify."101 As a result of this rather passive regulatory response,
the implementation of alternatives to central station generation
was left to the marketplace or to other government initiatives.
10 2
99. For representative decisions of the various federal and state agencies, see In re Pub-
lic Serv. Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), 3 N.R.C. 857 (1976),
afl'd, 6 N.R.C. 33 (1977); In re Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp. (Sterling Power Project Nu-
clear Unit No. 1), 6 N.R.C. 350 (1977); In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point
Nuclear Station, Unit 2), 7 A.E.C. 1046 (1974), affd, 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975); In re Appalachian
Power Co., 5 PUR 4th 334, 346-47 (1974), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 533 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 891 (1976); In re Roch-
ester Gas & Elec. Corp., N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80005 (Feb. 11, 1980). See also
McKim, supra note 95.
100. One notable exception was a decision of the New York PSC refusing to broaden an
investigation of the comparative costs of coal-fired and nuclear-fired capacity to include a
study of the costs of conservation and on-site alternative energy sources. While the PSC
acknowledged that the proposed study was clearly important to the formulation of energy
policy for New York State and the entire nation, it excused itself with the observation that:
[o]ur function is merely to see that the prices of electric power reflect cost....
It is not our function, in a consumer-sovereign economy, to go beyond that point
and consider the alternative of somehow artificially moderating those demands
even further, or planning for a smaller increment to capacity on the ground that
the result would otherwise be [too costly].
Costs of Nuclear and Fossil Fueled Facilities, 16 Op. NYPSC 144 (1976). See also ELECTmC-
ITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 108 (quoting FPC staff member who declared
that "planning for efficiency in power use was 'not our job' ").
101. See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,
Unit 2), 7 A.E.C. 1046, 1059-65, 1079-81 (1974), afl'd, 1 N.R.C. 347, 367-68
102. Reliance upon market forces for the allocation of capacity resources was particu-
larily misplaced. Since electricity is sold at prices which are below the marginal costs of its
production, the demand for electricity is "to high" (i.e., more than "optimal"). Allowing
consumer demand to measure the need for generating capacity thus assures that "too much"
capacity will be built. These pricing practices-which include the sale of electric energy at
prices that decline as consumption increases ("declining block rates"), that fail to reflect the
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Second, the regulators' failure to distinguish between "need"
different costs of on-peak and off-peak consumption ("time unrelated rates"), and which are
calculated on the basis of historic (average) plant costs-have come under intense criticism
from economists. See generally Mitchell, Manning Jr., & Acton, PEAK LOAD PRICING (1978).
Congress required in 1978 that all state regulatory commissions at least "consider" their
elimination. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, §§ 111,
112, 115, 92 Stat. 3117, 3121-23, 3125-28 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621, 2622, 2625 (Supp V
1981)). Some PUCs had acted prior to the federal initiative. See Brancato, New Approaches
to Current Problems in Electric Utility Rate Design, 2 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 40 (1975); In re
Electric Rate Design, 16 Op. NYPSC 671 (1976), reh'g denied, (Oct. 18, 1976) (concluding
that marginal cost pricing provided a reasonable basis for the design of electric rate struc-
tures). See also New York State Council of Retail Merchants v. PSC, 45 N.Y.2d 661, 348
N.E.2d 1282, 412 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1978) (upholding this regulatory initiative). Of course, it
will take years for cost-based tariffs to be fully implemented. See C. Cicchetti, Wisconsin's
Approach to Public Utility Regulation, in ENERGY AND COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION 489-
99 (1981) (rate reform bogged down in methodological debate).
Even after rate reform is accomplished, reliance upon the marketplace to allocate effi-
ciently capacity resources will remain misplaced because market imperfections lead the real-
world consumer to demand "too much" electricity even when he receives the "right" price
signal. In some cases, consumer ignorance is responsible; for example, a consumer may buy
an air conditioner which costs less to purchase but more to operate than another, simply
because he is unaware of the "life-cycle" costs of the appliance. In perhaps far more cases,
ignorance is not the explanation; thus, even if the life-cycle costs of both air conditioners are
known, the real-world consumer might still purchase the "wrong" one because future sav-
ings are not as important to him as present ones. Unfortunately, the typical energy supply
investment is one with relatively high initial costs. One major urban utility has estimated
that a conservation package for a "typical" residential customer might cost about $2,650
and pay for itself in about seven years. See Fuel Saving Ideas in Con Ed Display, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at C5, col. 2. Another study has concluded that on Long Island, an
average investment of $2,200 per household would not be recovered for eight years. See
Long Island Study Finds Solar Power Saves Most, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at D15, col.
4. The staff of the New York PSC has estimated the payback periods for wall insulation,
storm windows and clock thermostats to range from five and one-half to seven years, seven
and one-half years to ten years, and four and one-half to nine years, respectively. See In re
Request of Senator Pisani with Respect to the Home Insulation Act of 1976, NYPSC Opin-
ion No. 27064, at 15-16 (Matias, A.L.J. July 15, 1977).
This tendency of real-world consumers to "discount" future savings presents a signifi-
cant obstacle to the achievement of energy efficiency through the marketplace. Some studies
have concluded that the operative payback period for many consumers is as short as two
years. See ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 3, at 308 n.42. Although the prevalence of so strin-
gent an investment criterion (the equivalent of a 50% return) may seem dubious, legislative
measures designed to stimulate consumer investment in energy conservation-but built
around more modest assumptions-all have had relatively little success. For example, the
Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, § 101, 92 Stat. 3174, 3175-80 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 44C (1978)), effective April 19, 1977, made available a federal income tax credit (up
to $300) of 15% of the cost of various residential energy conservation measures such as
insulation, caulking, storm windows, clock thermostats, etc., and an additional credit (up to
$2,200) for 30% of the first $2,000 and 20% of the next $8,000 invested in a "renewable
energy source" such as wind generators or solar energy systems. According to the Internal
Revenue Service, by the end of 1978 these provisions had prompted an investment of $3.6
19831 REGULATING POWER PRODUCTION
and "demand" was compounded by their readiness to rely upon
the industry's demand forecasts. Long after these forecasts should
have been recognized as self-serving fantasy, they continued to be
rubber-stamped in the regulatory arena.03 The results were em-
barrassing. In some cases a utility would no sooner obtain a con-
struction permit on the basis of forecast capacity deficiencies than
it would "revise" its projections and announce a "deferred" in-ser-
vice date for the same unit.10 4 Where construction schedules were
billion in energy conservation measures and $116 million in renewable energy sources. See
Defining the Deductions on Passive Solar Units, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1980, at C7, col. 1.
This is a relatively modest sum when compared to the $220 billion of capital investment in
conservation which has been estimated to be cost-effective at just current energy costs. See
ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 3, at 308 n.95. Expressing the view that "a much stronger re-
sponse must be stimulated," Congress recently increased the federal credit available for "re-
newable energy source" expenditures to 40% of the first $10,000. See Crude Oil Windfall
Profits Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 202, 94 Stat. 229 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
44C(b)(2), (c)(2)(B) & (D) & (c)(5)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1981)).
Consumer investment in low-cost residential energy conservation financing programs has
also been minimal. New York, for example, has required since 1977 that the state's investor-
owned utilities offer residential consumers a $10 energy audit and, if requested, to arrange
for the financing of qualifying conservation investments-i.e., those with an estimated
payback period of less than seven years-at an interest cost equal to the company's last
allowed rate of return (which has been in the range of 9%-10%). See Home Insulation and
Energy Conservation Act of 1977, N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAWS §§ 135a-n (McKinney Supp. 1982).
In the first two years of operation, program results were minimal; the utilities conducted
16,000 audits, which generated 698 loans involving a total of $1,119,507. See NEW YORK PUB.
SERV. COMM'N, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE
HOME INSULATION AND ENERGY CONSERVATION ACT 12 (1980). Similar results have been ex-
perienced elsewhere. See Rural Heating Aid is Termed a Failure, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1979,
at A63, col. 1 (reporting that a United States Department of Agriculture financing program,
designed to provide $1 billion for the insulation of four million homes has produced in three
years loans totaling less than $1 million to about 1,000 households). For a more optimistic
view of the future of residential energy conservation programs than their history would
seem to warrant, see Finelea & Treiber, Residential Energy Conservation Measures: A
Penny Saved Is A Penny Earned, 11 ENvTL. L. 639 (1981).
103. For representative decisions, see, e.g., In re Rochester Gas And Elec. Corp. (Ster-
ling Power Project, Nuclear Unit No. 1), 6 N.R.C. 350 (1977); In re Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975); In re Rochester Gas
And Elec. Corp., N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80005 (Jan. 11, 1978). See generally
McKim, supra note 95.
104. The history of a New York nuclear power unit now under construction by the
Niagara Mohawk Corp. is illustrative. The company applied for a permit in June 1972, fore-
casting capacity deficiencies that required installation of the plant no later than December
1978. Opponents of the plant contended that the facility would not be needed before the
mid-1980s, at the earliest. The issue was litigated vigorously. In April 1975, the NRC appeal
board concluded that the utility's "forecasts" (a euphemism for a straightforward historical
extrapolation) were "reasonable," and licensed construction. See In re Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2), 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975). Just two
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not "stretched out" in this manner, it later became evident that
construction had begun prematurely-adding hundreds of millions
of dollars in unnecessary interest charges to the eventual cost of a
facility.105
D. Governmental Forecasting-An Unpromising Change in the
Basic Approach
Not surprisingly, the waste of such enormous sums has pro-
voked considerable concern, prompting efforts by many state regu-
lators to develop an independent forecasting capability. 06 Unfor-
tunately, while reduced reliance on industry forecasts is
undoubtedly a step in the right direction,10 7 it is a smaller one than
is commonly assumed. To be sure, "historical extrapolation" is a
forecasting methodology which has outlived its usefulness, and ca-
pacity planning can be improved by the use of modern econometric
and engineering techniques which increase our ability to anticipate
the impact of changing economic, social, and technological condi-
tions. 08 At the same time, it is too easy to be overly impressed by
the dazzling array of quantitative methods now being employed in
months later, the licensee announced that it was selling 59% of its interest in the plant to a
group of other companies. The scheduled in-service date for the plant was subsequently
"slipped"-first to 1982, then to 1984, and then to 1986. This case is not unique. A member
of the NRC has conceded that his agency's "need determinations have been wrong at least
as often as they have been right." See Bradford, Lightening the Nuclear Sled: Some Uses
and Misuses of the Three Mile Island Accident, Remarks before Seminar on Energy Policy
at N.Y. Univ. on Nov. 21, 1979, reprinted in 5 NRC Naws RELEASE 44 (Dec. 6, 1979).
105. For example, more than $750 million already had been invested in the Nine Mile
Point nuclear unit when, in 1980, its sponsors announced that the in-service date of the
plant (licensed in 1974 for service in 1980) was being deferred until at least 1986. Carrying
charges on this investment continue to accrue and will add hundreds of millions of dollars to
the cost of the plant, now projected to rise above $4 billion. See Financial and Cost Implica-
tions of Constructing the Nine Mile Point No. 2 Nuclear Station, NYPSC Opinion No. 82-7,
(Apr. 16, 1982).
106. According to the General Accounting Office, of the forty-one states which re-
sponded to its survey, nineteen had begun to develop either independent forecasts or analy-
ses to test the reasonableness of their utilities' projections. See ELECTRICITY PLANNING,
supra note 77, at 21.
107. Governmental demand forecasts generally have been lower than those of the utili-
ties; indeed, in only two of the nineteen state forecasts surveyed by the General Accounting
Office were the results even "close" to utility forecasts. Id. In a few instances these lower
governmental forecasts have led to disapproval of utility planned expansion. Id. at 22-23.
108. Econometric and engineering (or "end use") analyses are the two forecasting
methodologies which currently "share the spotlight." Id. at 17-18. See generally ENERGY
FUTURE, supra note 3, at 234-67.
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place of yesterday's straight-line extrapolations. Quite simply,
long-range projections of the demand for electricity are indetermi-
nate," 9 and there is no reasonably objective basis available for se-
lecting among even widely divergent forecasts.
Consider, for example, that while the Edison Electric Institute
recently forecast a 4.3% annual average load growth rate for the
next decade, the Department of Energy estimated a growth rate of
only 2.1%. 110 Both forecasts were produced by "state-of-the-art"
computer models, and it is not apparent that one model is any
"better" or more "sophisticated" than the other. The problem, of
course, is that each model incorporates different (yet, given the un-
certainties, equally "reasonable") assumptions about the factors
which influence the demand for electricity. These factors include
the price of oil, the availability of coal, the gross national product,
the cost of pollution controls, etc. Exacerbating this problem of
which variables to include in any growth model is the fact that
accurate forecasts of these variables remain well beyond the com-
pass of computers.""" Then, too, forecasts do not consider the pos-
sibility of technological developments within the fifteen year plan-
ning period, such as the electric car, which could have a major
impact upon electricity consumption patterns." 2 Realistically, the
109. See, e.g., LANDSBERG, ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, 91-113 (1980); SCHURR,
ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: THE CHOICES BEFORE Us 204-17 (1980).
110. See generally DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR
THE CONTIGUOUS UNITED STATES 1980-1989 (July 1980).
111. See generally ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 3, at 234-67. In a recent New York
power plant certification proceeding, eleven different long-range (fifteen year) demand fore-
casts were examined. The highest (32,465 Mw) was referred to as the utility "business as
usual" forecasts, and the lowest (21,831 Mw) was a consumer-environmentalist sponsored
"pessimistic" forecast. The difference betwen the two forecasts-more than 10,000
Mw-represented capital costs of more than $10 billion. Despite the size of this gulf, the
siting board found "[n]either forecast . . . given its assumptions, demonstrably wrong or
inaccurate." See In re Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp. (Sterling Nuclear Power Plant), N.Y.
Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80005, at 6 (Feb. 11, 1980). See also In re Kansas Gas & Elec.
Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), 7 N.R.C. 320 (1978), where the applicant's
econometric model forecast 1982 as the required in-service date for the plant while an inter-
venor's econometric model forecast 1990. Unable to find any basis for choosing one forecast
over the other, the NRC selected the applicant's forecast, observing: "Whether eventually
proven right or wrong, that prediction stood on at least equal footing with . . . [the inter-
venor's]." Id. at 333.
112. According to Alvin Weinberg, former director of the Oak Ridge National Labora-
tory, "[t]wo technical developments, the electric car and the heat pump, could swing the
balance toward an electrical future dominated by large central stations." See ENERGY USERS
REP. (BNA) No. 330, at 16-17 (Dec. 6, 1979). See also DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, INFORMATION
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development of a long-range demand forecast as a basis for capac-
ity planning turns more upon faith than upon science.
Under these circumstances, it should come as no surprise to
discover that the decision-making process is more conciliatory than
analytical. In a typical case, both "high" and "low" forecasts will
be rejected in favor of some "mid-range" projection which, for that
reason alone, will be characterized as "reasonable.' 1 3 For example,
when a government agency is confronted by a utility prediction of
annual growth of 5.5% and a competing forecast of 4.5%, the al-
lure of a 5% figure can be compelling.114 Nevertheless, the costs of
even such a seemingly small compromise can be extraordinary. In
New York, every .1% increase in the load-growth rate adds 400
Mw to the fifteen year forecast of capacity requirements.'" For the
nation, the figures are staggering. The General Accounting Office
has estimated that the cost of meeting the industry's forecast ca-
pacity requirements for only the next decade approaches $333 bil-
lion, but that a 1% lower growth rate (about half the difference
between the current forecasts of the industry and the government)
would obviate the need for 75,000 Mw of capacity, saving $108 bil-
lion." ' Costs of this magnitude would seem to exceed any socially
tolerable margin of error and, accordingly, an approach to capacity
planning which continues to rely upon the selection of a long range
demand forecast (even where an "independent" governmental fore-
cast is among the available array) would seem to be unacceptable.
The development by the regulators of an independent demand
capability seems also to have come too late. Today the industry's
expansion plans are no longer derived simply from demand projec-
tions. Because predicted growth failed to materialize for the past
ten years, the industry has begun to emphasize new reasons for
continuing to build new power plants. The claim is now commonly
made that new coal or nuclear capacity is required-whether de-
No. 3, at 26 (June 22, 1979) (announcing the development of a four-passenger, subcompact
experimental electric car designed to be mass-produced economically by 1985).
113. See In re Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station), N.Y. Bd.
on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80003, at 9 (Sept. 8, 1980); In re Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp.
(Sterling Nuclear Power Plant), N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80005, at 7; In re Roches-
ter Gas and Elec. Co. (Sterling Power Project Nuclear Unit No. 1), 6 N.R.C. 350, 374-99
(1977).
114. See In re Niagara Mohawk Corp., 17 Op. NYPSC 1056 (1977).
115. See STATE ENERGY PLANNING PROCEEDINGS, supra note 26, at 33-35.
116. ELECTRICITY PLANNING, supra note 77, at 15-16.
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mand grows or not-as an "economic substitute" for expensive oil-
fired generation." 7 In addition, the industry contends that the con-
struction of new coal and nuclear facilities should be viewed as an
important part of the nation's pursuit of "energy independence,"
since each new 1,000 Mw power plant can produce the annual en-
ergy equivalent of about ten million barrels of foreign oil.1 '
In some instances this shift to new criteria for capacity plan-
ning has been particularly dramatic. For example, in 1979 the New
York Power Pool declared that the "paramount consideration" in
developing its generation expansion plan was a reduction in its de-
pendence on foreign petroleum resources." 9 More often, however,
the new planning criteria are employed with subtlety. New capac-
ity is still said to be justified primarily by projected growth in de-
mand, but utilities also argue that the new "need" theories justify
an "early" addition of the new plant-that is, an in-service date in
advance of forecast capacity deficiencies. 20 This use of the new
"need" theories masks their true significance; while they appear
merely to supplement a traditional "need" case, in reality they are
dispositive. Since long-range demand forecasts are indeterminate,
"need" findings will turn on the burden of proof (i.e., on a selec-
tion of the preferred direction of error).' 2' Acceptance of the new
"need" contentions thus has the effect of allocating that burden to
the opponents of the proposed expansion. If "early" capacity addi-
tions are always to be preferred over "late" ones, then the appro-
117. See, e.g., Parisi, Talking Business with Leland F. Sillin, Jr. of Northeast Utilities,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1979, at D3, col. 1 ("Even if we had no load growth, we should be
putting on nuclear reactors anyway because of the economics"); In re Commonwealth
Edison Co., NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20, 168 (111. Commerce Comm'n, Oct. 15, 1980)
(completion of nuclear unit justified even in the case of zero load growth).
118. See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point, Unit 2), 7 A.E.C.
1046, 1068 (1974), aff'd, 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975). See also Another Setback for Seabrook, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 1979, at F19, col. 3 (noting the claim by Public Service Co. of New Hamp-
shire that its Seabrook nuclear station was "necessary" in order to make a "major dent" in
New Hampshire's dependence on Middle Eastern oil).
119. 1 NEW YORK POWER POOL, REPORT OF THE MEMBER SYSTEMS 9 (1979).
120. See, e.g., New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st
Cir. 1978) (capacity deficiencies forecast for 1985, but unit planned for service in 1981); In
re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Lake Erie Generating Station), N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E
Case No. 80007 (Apr. 23, 1980); In re Rochester Gas and Elec. Co. (Stering Nuclear Power
Plant), N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80005 (Feb. 11, 1980).
121. Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 642-43 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("crystal ball" not required, but predictor must "make a showing of reliability of the
methodology of prediction...").
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priate response to uncertainty concerning demand is always to is-
sue the contested license. Resolution of the differences in
competing demand forecasts thus becomes unnecessary.'22
E. The New "Need" Theories
There is perhaps some merit in the new "need" theories, but
just how much is difficult to say. Calculations of the comparative
economics of different generating modes are quite complex. 2 3 For
example, even assuming that the relative prices of oil, coal, and
uranium make a new coal or nuclear plant cheaper to operate than
an existing oil-fired facility, rising capital costs have left unclear
whether the operation cost savings over the life of the new plant
will be sufficient to offset the fixed charges of its construction. 24
Such calculations are highly sensitive to assumptions about a large
number of factors including the future course of construction costs,
power plant performance, fuel prices, health and safety regulation,
and inflation.125 Whether electricity from a coal or nuclear unit
planned today for future service will be more or less expensive
than oil-fired generation from existing plants is thus a question
which invites at least as much guesswork as a long-range demand
forecast.
Of course, the economics of energy from alternative sources
deserves to be considered as well. Surely it makes no sense to re-
place oil-fired generators with coal or nuclear units if the same ob-
jective can be accomplished more cheaply and more quickly by the
conversion of existing oil-fired boilers to coal,12 by the more effi-
122. See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,
Unit 2), 7 A.E.C. 1046, 1083-84 (June 14, 1974) (benefits of nuclear-for-fossil fuel substitu-
tions make it "unnecessary" to determine a "year of need" for a proposed nuclear power
plant), aff'd on other grounds, 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975).
123. See generally DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, PROJECTED COSTS OF ELECTRICITY FROM
NUCLEAR AND COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS (Aug. 1982); In re Motion of Commission as to the
Comparative Economics of Nuclear and Fossil Generating Facilities, NYPSC Opinion No.
26974 (Reed, A.L.J., Dec. 18, 1978).
124. See, e.g., In re Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station), N.Y.
Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80003 (Sept. 8, 1980).
125. See generally In re Motion of Comm'n as to the Comparative Economics of Nu-
clear and Fossil Fueled Generating Facilities, NYPSC Opinion No. 26974 (Reed, A.L.J., Dec.
18, 1978); In re Long Range Electric Plans, NYPSC Opinion No. 78-3 at 19-22 (Mar. 6,
1978).
126. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS
OF CONVERTING OIL-FIRED UTILITY BOILERS To COAL (1980) (concluding that coal conversion
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cient utilization of existing facilities,2 7 by the development of re-
newable energy sources such as geothermal steam, solar, wind, or
low-head hydro, s8 or by some combination of these strategies and
others. The construction of new nuclear or coal-fired electric gener-
ating stations is just one of many possible reactions to the current
dependence upon foreign oil. Whether it is a prudent response can
be determined only by a careful, balanced consideration of the full
array of energy supply options, not by the talismanic incantation
of shibboleths such as "fuel substitution" and "energy
independence.
'129
The industry's current claims for continued central station ca-
pacity expansion thus deserve close scrutiny. Unfortunately, in the
first case to reach the courts, these claims received less than rigor-
ous review.13 In its 1973 application to the NRC for a permit to
construct the Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclear power station,
the Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSCo.) con-
tended that the plant was needed to meet forecast capacity defi-
ciencies beginning in 1981.11 An NRC licensing board agreed, but
the appeal board rejected this finding as establishing a need for the
plant before 1985 because the licensing board had failed to allow
full cross-examination of certain testimony bearing on the utility's
demand projections for the period 1981-1985.132 Nevertheless, the
appeal board determined that there was a "need" for the Seabrook
facility during this earlier period because it concluded that the
should be favored over new construction in most cases).
127. According to recent studies, U.S. energy imports could be totally displaced within
ten years by conservation measures available in the building and transportation sectors. C.
FLAVIN, ENERGY AND ARCHITECTURE: THE SOLAR AND CONSERVATION POTENTIAL (1980).
128. Yergin, Conservation: The Key Energy Source, in ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 3,
at 136-82; Maidique, Solar America, in ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 3, at 183-215.
129. California utilities, at the urging of the California PUC, may be developing a more
rational "oil blackout" investment strategy-one where the investment "promising the high-
est payoff should have first call on society's resources." See ENERGY CONSERVATION AND PUB-
LIC POLICY (Sawhill ed. 1979). Two California companies are reportedly now planning signif-
icant increments of nonconventional new capacity instead of coal fired generation. See
California Utilities Reassess Role in Allen-Warner Electricity Project, ENERGY USERS RE-
PORT (BNA) No. 393, at 321 (Feb. 19, 1981).
130. See New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87, 96-98 (1st
Cir. 1978).
131. In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), 3
N.R.C. 857, 902 (1976).
132. In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), 6
N.R.C. 33, 90-95 (1977).
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plant could generate electricity more "economically" than PSCo.'s
existing oil-fired capacity."' 3
Opponents of the plant challenged this conclusion, contending
that it was flawed by the board's failure to take capital costs into
account in calculating the cost of power generation. The simple
theory of this challenge appears sound: The construction of a new
power plant four years before its capacity might otherwise be re-
quired by reliability considerations imposes additional capital.
charges on its owner; whether such construction (and the retire-
ment of an existing facility) is "economical" requires a comparison
of these charges with any operation cost savings which might ac-
crue.13' A calculation which ignores these capital charges is thus
meaningless, and any licensing action predicated upon such a cal-
culation should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. For some
reason, the First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, observing:
"We do not think it would be unreasonable to base the cost com-
parison on operation costs given that the need for the additional
power, and thus the need to construct a plant, at some point in the
future had already been established." '
Just what this means is not easy to say. Since "the need for
additional power . . . at some point in the future" can always be
established (it is the forecast rate of growth, not growth itself,
which invites disagreement), the decision can be interpreted to
provide approval for the early construction of new power plants in
all cases (since their operating costs are invariably lower than
those of older units). In addition, it would seem the earlier the con-
struction commences the better, for further operating cost savings
will accrue every year.
On the other hand, a far narrower ruling is suggested by the
court's additional observation: "But in the alternative the Board
stated that the nuclear plant would be a preferable substitute even
if construction costs were considered. 1 3 6 The court thus may sim-
ply have held that the appeal board calculations had not, in fact,
been made as the petitioners claimed. While this reading of the
133. Id. at 95-98.
134. See, e.g., In re Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station), N.Y.
Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80003 (Sept. 8, 1980).





decision is less disturbing than the broader one, it is disturbing
enough. At the very least, it reveals a judicial readiness to accept
an administrative determination of comparative generating costs
supported by little, if any, evidence. To be sure, the appeal board
"stated" that its comparative cost calculation had taken capital
costs into account, but this statement-an off-hand, one sentence
reference to a "study" performed by PSCo.1157-indicates that the
board's consideration of the matter had been cursory at best. Such
an analysis is certainly not the kind of "hard look" upon which
reviewing courts often insist.138
On occasion, some state regulators have given the new utility
"need" claims the scrutiny they deserve, even without judicial
prodding. While acknowledging the conceptual validity of the "fuel
substitution" theories, they have nevertheless insisted upon factual
support for particular applications (which, as yet, has not been
forthcoming).13 9 Future decisions like these, however, are likely to
be few and far between. The complexity of the issues, the mesmer-
izing influence of slogans, the growing unpopularity of regulation
generally, and the judicial imprimatur in Seabrook all suggest that
the new "need" claims of the utilities will be as readily rubber-
stamped as the old. Under the current approach, the regulation of
capacity expansion thus promises to remain a very costly illusion.
III. SOME MODEST REFORMS
The best regulation of electric utility capacity expansion in
the long run will probably be no regulation at all. Since the genera-
tion of electricity is no longer characterized by economies of scale
(i.e., declining costs for each additional unit of output),140 the "nat-
137. In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), 6
N.R.C. 33, 97 (1977).
138. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). See generally Rod-
gers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo.
L. J. 699, 701-08 (1979); GELLHORN, BYSE, AND STRAUSS, ADMINSTRATivE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 343-50 (7th ed. 1979).
139. See, e.g., In re Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station) N.Y.
Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80003, at 10-19 (Sept. 8, 1980); In re NAGARA MOHAWK POWER
CORP. (Lake Erie Generating Station), N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80007, at 11, 24-26
(Apr. 23, 1980); In re Rochester Gas and Elec. Co. (Sterling Nuclear Power Plant), N.Y. Bd.
on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80005, at 10-15 (Feb. 11, 1980).
140. See Loose & Flaim, supra note 13; Jones, supra note 13, at 501.
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ural monopoly" rationale for regulation no longer applies 4' and
competition presumably can be relied upon for an efficient alloca-
tion of new capacity resources. 42 Still, no matter how desirable the
deregulation of electric generation may be, it is not likely to be
accomplished overnight.143 In the meantime, mindful of John May-
nard Keynes' dictum that "in the long run we are all dead,' 14 4 con-
sideration should be given to less ambitious reforms.
A. Restructuring Regulation
1. Federal regulation: History and prognosis. At the federal
level, responsibility for the regulation of electric utility capacity
expansion fell upon the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) quite
by accident. Authorized in 1954 to license the construction and op-
eration of nuclear power plants, the AEC initially was concerned
only with the protection of radiological health and safety; other is-
sues, such as the environmental or economic impact of a proposed
power reactor, were beyond the Commission's purview."4 This sit-
uation changed rather dramatically with the passage of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).146 All federal
agencies were suddenly instructed to give "appropriate considera-
tion" to environmental values when exercising their statutory pow-
141. See, e.g., KAHN, supra note 9, at 119 ("The critical . . . characteristic of natural
monopoly is an inherent tendency to decreasing unit costs...").
142. A variety of proposals for the deregulation of electric generation have already been
made. See Pace & London, Alternative Scenarios for Deregulating the Electric Utility In-
dustry, in ELECTRIC POWER: CURRENT ISSUES IN REGULATION AND FINANCING 755 (Allen ed.
1982); Note, Efficiency and Competition in the Electric Power Industry, 88 YALE L.J. 1511
(1979); B. Commoner, supra note 37.
143. While overnight success cannot be expected, a modest deregulation effort imple-
mented by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, §§ 201-
210, 92 Stat. 3141 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 796, 824(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980)), which requires
electric utilities to purchase electricity from cogenerators and small power producers, was
recently upheld by the Supreme Court. See American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. Federal
Energy Reg. Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir.), reo'd sub noam. American Paper Inst. v.
American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1921 (1983) (FERC regulations implementing
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion).
144. OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 296 (3d ed. 1979).
145. See New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962
(1969) (consideration of possible thermal pollution from discharge of cooling water by nu-
clear power plant was beyond AEC's jurisdiction).
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). As evidence of this dramatic shift, see Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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ers.147 In addition, because the licensing of even an individual nu-
clear power plant was held to be "major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment,"14 the AEC was
required to file a "detailed statement" 149 which discussed the envi-
ronmental impact of and alternatives to each proposed facility.1
50
The standard environmental impact statement (EIS) filed by the
AEC also included a chapter discussing the "need" for additional
generating capacity on the applicant utility system.
151
There was nothing in NEPA which explicitly required a cost-
benefit analysis. Nevertheless, some courts had held that the Act
authorized them to set aside as "arbitrary and capricious" any
agency action which clearly failed to give sufficient weight to envi-
ronmental values15 2 and, in connection with this aspect of judicial
review, these courts seemed to expect that the EIS would include a
discussion of the benefits and costs of the proposed agency ac-
tion.153 Since the major benefit of a power plant was acknowledged
to be the electricity it would produce,5 if there was no demonstra-
ble need for this electricity, the significant environmental costs of
construction and operation of the plant would presumably tip the
NEPA scales against it. The logic of this conclusion seemed ines-
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(B) (1976).
148. Izaak Walton League of America v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 293 (D.D.C.
1971).
149. Id. at 293, (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976)).
150. Cf. Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. v. AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1973) (up-
holding AEC determination that issuance of license to Columbia University to operate a
small research reactor in New York City was not a major federal action requiring prepara-
tion of an EIS), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 951 (1974).
151. See, e.g., ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT RELATED TO
CONSTRUCTION OF NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2, No. 50-410 (June 1973). See
generally McKim, supra note 95, at 59-60, 66-69.
152. See Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1115 ("The reviewing courts probably cannot re-
verse a substantive decision on its merits ... unless it be shown that the actual balance of
costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to envi-
ronmental values"). Other courts have held that NEPA does not require an explicit benefit
cost analysis, and the authorities remain split. See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 744-47 (1977). The Council on Environmental Quality's regulations implementing
NEPA appear to avoid the question. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1982).
153. Calvert Cliffs', 499 F.2d at 1114; United States v. Thompson, 463 F.2d 1258, 1262
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Castle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1051 n.65 (1978).
154. See, e.g., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT RELATED TO CONSTRUCTION OF NINE
MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2, supra note 151, at 10-11 (expected generation from
plants its "primary benefit"); In re Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and
2), 4 N.R.C. 397, 405 (1976) (expected generation from plant its "principal 'benefit' ").
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capable, and it led the AEC to rule that "a determination that
there is a 'genuine need for the electricity to be produced' is an
essential element in approval of a license for a nuclear facility."' 5
"Need for power," the AEC observed, was simply a "shorthand ex-
pression for the 'benefit' side of the cost-benefit balance which
NEPA mandates for a proceeding considering the licensing of a
nuclear power plant."156
Inseparable from this "cost-benefit balance" was a considera-
tion of alternatives to the proposed action which could affect the
balance to be struck. Section 102(2)(C)(iii) of the Act required the
EIS to contain a detailed discussion of "alternatives to the pro-
posed action, ' 15 7 and emphasis was added by section 102(2)(D),
which directed all federal agencies to "study, develop and describe
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action."'158 To-
gether, these requirements for a thorough discussion and study of
alternatives were characterized as the "linchpin" of the decisional
process envisioned by the Act,5 " a process which was described in
the landmark Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC deci-
sion as having been designed
to ensure that each agency decision maker has before him and takes into
proper account all possible approaches to a particular project (including total
abandonment of the project) which would alter the environmental impact
and the cost-benefit balance. Only in that fashion is it likely that the most
intelligent, optimally beneficial decision will ultimately be made.'
While it may be doubted that "optimally beneficial" decision mak-
ing by the bureaucracy was ever really anticipated, the courts have
made it clear that it was an ideal for which the federal agencies
were expected to strive.
In National Resources Defense Council v. Morton,'' the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals held that NEPA required an
agency to include in its consideration of "alternatives" to a pro-
155. In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), 1
N.R.C. 347, 352 (1975).
156. In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), 6
N.R.C. 33, 90 (1975).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).
158. Id. § 4332(2)(E).
159. Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697-98 (2d Cir.
1972).
160. Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1114.
161. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) [hereinafter cited as NRDC v. Morton].
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posed action even some which were beyond the Agency's statutory
power to implement. Thus, before the Secretary of Interior could
sell offshore oil and gas leases, he was required to consider (and
had to discuss in an EIS) such energy supply alternatives as the
elimination of oil import quotas, modifications in natural gas pric-
ing policies, the termination of state controls over domestic oil pro-
duction and the accelerated development of nuclear power, even
though the implementation of each of these "alternatives" was en-
tirely beyond his jurisdiction. Observing that NEPA sought to
avoid the piecemeal approach to environmental problems which so
often was taken by agencies whose vision was narrowed by mission-
oriented mandates, the court reasoned that if the Secretary of In-
terior could limit his consideration of alternatives to those within
his existing authority, environmental policy would continue to be
made "in small but steady increments.' 16 2 In contrast, said the
court, NEPA required a "comprehensive approach to environmen-
tal management."163
This broadly construed obligation to weigh the costs and bene-
fits of alternatives to a proposed power reactor added an enormous
new dimension to the AEC's licensing responsibilities.'" An appli-
cant for a construction permit invariably forecast a growing de-
mand for electricity on its system and, on this basis, claimed that
the proposed facility was "needed" to maintain adequate generat-
ing reserves. Plainly, this was an objective which could be met by a
variety of alternatives, including so-called "energy conservation"
measures and "on-site" energy sources which might eliminate or at
least moderate growth in demand. Thus, the Calvert Cliffs' and
Morton decisions quickly prompted the opponents of nuclear
power to champion just such "alternatives" before the AEC.,, 5 Af-
ter early resistance, the AEC grudgingly conceded that "the sub-
ject of energy conservation" could not be "altogether ruled out of
licensing proceedings," 66 and licensing interventions focusing on
162. Id. at 836.
163. Id.
164. See generally Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licens-
ing Process: Environmental Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
963 (1972).
165. See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,
Unit 2), 7 A.E.C. 1046 (Initial Decision, 1974), affd, 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975).




this subject became commonplace. 167 Licensing boards, which had
previously been required to deal mainly with narrow, highly tech-
nical questions of reactor safety,""' now were being confronted with
extraordinarily broad questions of energy supply policy: For what
"end uses" would the electricity from a proposed nuclear power
plant be required and could these requirements be met at lower
costs.by a variety of energy conservation measures and alternative
energy sources?"6 9
The results were predictable. While hearings grew lengthier
and more costly, they also became charades. Every construction
permit proceeding held by the AEC culminated in the conclusion
that there was indeed a "need for power" on the applicant's system
and that the proposed nuclear facility was the "optimal" response
to that need.170 While the AEC gave lip service to its obligation to
consider the full array of possible alternatives to the 1,000 Mw nu-
clear power plant typically proposed, in reality it never examined
seriously the merits of any alternative policy option except that of
the equally large coal-fired facility.171 This default should have
been obvious, but was hardly noticed because of the way the AEC
structured its "need for power" inquiry, which it approached in
two stages.
167. See, e.g., In re Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), 7 A.E.C.
659 (Partial Initial Decision of ASLB, Apr. 9, 1974), aff'd, 4 N.R.C. 397 (1976); In re Niag-
ara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), 7 A.E.C. 1046 (Initial
Decision of ASLB, June 14, 1974), aff'd, 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975); In re Florida Power and Light
Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), 8 A.E.C. 117 (Order of ASLB, July 12, 1974);
In re Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2), 8 A.E.C.
277 (Initial Decision of ASLB, Aug. 2, 1974); In re Duquesne Light Co. (Perry Nuclear
Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), 8 A.E.C. 644 (Memorandum and Order of ASLB, Oct. 1, 1974).
168. See generally S. EBIN & R. KASPER, CITIZEN GaouPs AND THE NUCLEAR POWER
CONTROVERSY. USES OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION (1974); Cramton, A
Comment on Trial-Type Hearings In Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585
(1972).
169. See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,
Unit 2), 7 A.E.C. 1046 (Initial Decision of ASLB, June 14, 1974), af/'d, 1 N.R.C. 347 (1975).
170. For a representative sample of these decisions by the Agency's appeal board, see,
In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), 1 N.R.C. 347
(1975); In re Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), 4 N.R.C. 397
(1976); In re Tennessee Valley Auth. (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B), 5
N.R.C. 92 (1977); In re Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and
2) 6 N.R.C. 33 (1977); In re Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit
1), 7 N.R.C. 320 (1978); In re Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power
Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 and 4), 8 N.R.C. 234 (1978).
171. See supra note 170. See also McKim, supra note 95, at 66-76.
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First, the ABC addressed the question of whether the appli-
cant had demonstrated a "need" for additional baseload generating
capacity on its system; if so, it would next examine whether a nu-
clear plant was the least costly way of supplying this capacity.
1 2
"Need," it will be recalled, was equated with "demand," and thus
the question of whether the applicant had demonstrated a "need"
for new baseload capacity simply raised the question of whether
the applicant's demand forecasts were reasonable. 173 Since these
forecasts purported to include an estimate of the extent to which
consumers would employ energy conservation measures to reduce
their energy requirements, or satisfy them with on-site energy
sources, these measures appeared to receive "consideration" during
the first stage of the "need for power" inquiry.17 4 If this first stage
of the inquiry led to the conclusion that the day eventually would
arrive when the applicant would require additional capacity, there
would be no reason at the second stage of the inquiry to consider
conservation measures and on-site sources again, for the AEC
could say that they had been "implicitly considered in the... de-
mand projections.
'17 5
Unfortunately, this argument failed to account for the differ-
ent focuses of the stage one and stage two inquiries. At stage one,
in evaluating the applicant's demand forecasts, the question was to
what extent energy conservation and on-site sources would be em-
ployed by the applicant's customers. At stage two, the question
warranting discussion was to what extent such measures should be
implemented as an alternative to the expansion of central station
172. See McKim, supra note 95, at 66-70; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, PRELMINARY
STATEMENT ON GENERAL POLICY FOR RULEMAKNG TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR PowER PLANT Li-
CENSING 14-16, 51-53, 57-60 (1978)..
173. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
174. See supra note 170.
175. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See also In re Rochester Gas &
Elec. Corp. (Sterling Power Project Nuclear Unit No. 1), 6 N.R.C. 350 (Initial Decision of
ASLB, Aug. 26, 1977), where the intervenors contended that there was inadequate proof of
"need" because the utility had underestimated the effects of energy conservation measures
(Contention 1) and, also, that there had not been adequate consideration of energy conser-
vation alternatives to the proposed facility (Contention 10). After concluding that the appli-
cant and the staff had "considered conservation as best they could," id. at 377, and that
Contention 1 should be rejected, the Commission went on to treat Contention 10 in one
sentence: "[W]e have previously described the consideration given to energy conservation in
our ruling on Contention 1." Id. at 410.
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capacity. Under the AEC's approach, this second question was
never asked and thus the merits of these nonsupply options, as
policy alternatives to capacity expansion, were never considered."'
While this abdication of NEPA responsibilities was criticized by
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Aeschliman v.
NRC, 1' it was never corrected.
178
In retrospect, this failure to consider the full range of alterna-
tives to reactor licensing seems to have been inevitable. The AEC
was simply not the proper agency to consider this issue; its objec-
tivity was initially compromised by a mandate to promote "the de-
velopment and utilization of atomic energy, ' 17 and while its pro-
motional and regulatory functions were later separated by the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,180 this legislative surgery was
largely cosmetic. The federal government's long-standing commit-
ment to the commercialization of nuclear power' 81 was just too
deeply ingrained to be changed by an organizational reshuffle,1
8 2
and an overlay of NEPA responsibilities was insufficient to
counteract this inherent promotional bias.
While NEPA required the AEC and NRC to consider alterna-
tives to a proposed reactor license, it failed to provide the agency
with any authority to implement such alternatives. 183 Thus, while
the AEC could perhaps have declined to license a proposed nuclear
power plant on the ground that some other source of energy-e.g.,
176. See IMPROVING REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS IN FEDERAL/STATE SITING ACTIONS,
supra note 77, at 5-6 (NRC has been successful in focusing intervenors' energy conservation
contentions into the need for power context even though energy conservation contentions
can also be logically viewed as raising issues regarding alternatives to the facility itself);
McKim, supra note 95, at 67-68.
177. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
178. See In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. (Sterling Power Project Nuclear Unit No.
1), 6 N.R.C. 350 (Initial Decision of ASLB, Aug. 26, 1977). For a discussion of this case, see
supra note 175.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1976).
180. Id. § 5801.
181. See generally I. BuPP & J. DERAIN, LIGHT WATER: How THE NUCLEAR DREAM Dis-
SOLVED (1978).
182. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
ISLAND 19 (1979). ("We have seen evidence that some of the old promotional philosophy still
influences the regulatory practices of the NRC").
183. See, e.g., NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d at 827. The major premise of that decision
was, of course, that the Secretary of Interior lacked the power to implement the "alterna-
tives" which the court nevertheless held NEPA required him to consider.
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wind generators-was environmentally preferable,"' it remained
unable either to pursue this alternative or to compel its pursuit by
the applicant. The denial of a reactor license on environmental
grounds might then have proven entirely counterproductive be-
cause a utility whose application was rejected was free to build a
fossil-fired plant which, arguably, would do even greater harm to
the environment. Of course, the AEC might have chosen to deal
184. The existence of even this authority remains debatable since the Supreme Court
has steadfastly declined to find any substantive content in NEPA. See, e.g., Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) and Strycker's Bay Neighbor-
hood Council Inc. v. Karlan, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1979) (per curiam). These, however, were
cases in which the Court was presented with claims that NEPA imposed a substantive "obli-
gation" upon federal agencies which required them to develop special procedures for deci-
sions which affected the environment, Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548, or to give special
weight to environmental values, Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227-28. The rejection of these
contentions does not necessarily mean that these agencies lacked substantive "authority" to
protect the environment. In both cases the Court recognized that NEPA established "signif-
icant substantive goals for the Nation"; See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558, and Stryck-
er's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227. Because § 102(1) of the Act expressly directs all agencies to inter-
.pret and administer the laws of the United States "to the fullest extent possible .. . in
accordance with the policies set forth in this Chapter," it seems reasonable to conclude that,
at least when an agency exercises its statutory powers, NEPA provides an independent
source of authority to protect the environment. The great majority of writers take this view.
See, e.g., the authorities collected in Tobias & McLean, Of Crabbed Interpretations and
Frustrated Mandates: The Effect of Environmental Policy Acts on Pre-Existing Agency
Authority, 41 MoNT. L. Rav. 177, 177-224 (1980). Recent decisions of the courts of appeals
support this view as well. For example, in Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. NRC,
582 F.2d 77 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978), the NRC conditioned a reactor
license on an environmentally acceptable off-site routing of transmission lines running from
the facility. The utility challenged the condition, arguing that it was beyond the agency's
jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy Act and NEPA. After finding that these transmission
lines were properly regarded as components of a "utilization facility" over which the agency
had licensing authority under the Atomic Energy Act, id. at 82-84, the court concluded that
NEPA provided authority for the license condition, id. at 85-86, observing as follows: "Once
having found that the Commission has jurisdiction over the transmission lines, we think it
clear that, under the dictates of NEPA, it was obliged to minimize adverse environmental
impact flowing therefrom." Id. at 85. See also Detroit Edison Co. v. NRC, 630 F.2d 450 (6th
Cir. 1980). On the other hand, it has been long recognized that NEPA imposes no duty upon
an agency to take actions inconsistent with pre-existing "specific statutory obligations"; see
Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1125. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee
may be read to say that under the Atomic Energy Act control of the choice of power plant
generating mode lies with the states, then the denial of a reactor license on the ground that
the use of some other energy source would minimize adverse environmental impacts might
be seen as in conflict with an existing statutory scheme and hence, unauthorized by NEPA.
See Natural Resource Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding
that the Secretary of Interior lacks discretion to deny a coal lease solely on environmental
grounds because a statute other than NEPA required him to issue leases to the holders of
valid prospection permits).
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with this problem by expounding upon the suboptimal nature of
the proposed nuclear power plant in its EIS while it nevertheless
issued a license, but it is a small wonder that such a self-stultifying
option was never exercised. Thus, the absence of the power to im-
plement alternatives sapped all vitality from the obligation to con-
sider them;18 5 another example of misplaced faith in the redemp-
tive quality of procedural reform.""e
This was especially true in connection with "nonsupply" alter-
natives. While many regulators appreciated a new power plant's
twin threats to environmental quality and cheap electric rates, few
doubted the existence of a direct correlation between the consump-
tion of energy and economic growth. This so-called "iron-link"
187
between energy and gross national product remained an article of
faith which no regulator was about to challenge. A typically rever-
ant expression of this faith can be found in an EIS written by the
staff of the AEC:
This historical correlation between economic activity and consumption of
electric power is impressive. . . . Without claiming that the underlying rela-
tionship is either well understood or immutable, it is the opinion of the Staff
that the strength of the correlation should serve as a warning that a chronic
shortage of power in a region may have pronounced economic and social con-
sequences .... 188
It was even less realistic, of course, to expect any regulator to
have the temerity to go further and suggest that economic growth
itself be curtailed. Unfortunately, energy conservation proposals
were too easily misperceived as "no-growth" measures rather than
"efficient-growth" options-this may explain the AEC's acquies-
185. Cf. Kentucky v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714, (6th Cir. 1981) (in deciding to issue per-
mit to developer for construction of port and industrial complex, Army Corps of Engineers
need not consider "alternative" of site not proposed by developer).
186. See Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973). The
lesson had been learned before, see Kaufman, Power For the People - And by the People:
Utilities, the Environment and the Public Interest, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1971) (conclud-
ing that FPC licensing proceedings had too narrow a perspective to bring the full range of
project alternatives into view). See also Hill & Ortolano, NEPA's Effect on the Considera-
tion of Alternatives: A Crucial Test, 18 NAT. RES. J. 285 (1978) (an empirical study of the
Corps of Engineers and Soil Conservation Service concluding that agency personnel merely
give lip service to their "obligation" to consider alternatives).
187. The term is coined in ENmG FUTUR , supra note 3, at 141-42.
188. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT RELATED To CONSTRUCTION OF NINE MILE
POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2, supra note 151, at 10-3.
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cent equation of "need" with "demand."' 89 Additionally, there was
simply no provision in NEPA which suggested that Congress had
intended the AEC, or any federal agency for that matter, to make
a determination of the level of energy consumption at which the
quality of life was supposedly maximized. Thus, "need for power"
and "energy conservation alternatives" to capacity expansions were
not going to receive serious consideration in AEC licensing pro-
ceedings, whatever place they deserved in a theoretically ideal
search for "the most intelligent, optimally beneficial decision." 190
After the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee,' 9' it
seems fair to question whether these issues ever deserved to be
considered at all in these proceedings. The case arose out of a li-
censing proceeding'92 in which the AEC had declined to consider
intervenor advanced "energy conservation alternatives" which
failed to pass what the AEC called a "threshold test" of reasona-
bleness. 93 Drawing upon familiar doctrine which taught that the
Commission had an affirmative obligation to consider alternatives,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, con-
cluding that the threshold test had impermissibly shifted this obli-
gation to the intervenors by requiring them "to prove an alterna-
tive satisfies 'the rule of reason' before the Commission will
investigate it.'
1 4
The Supreme Court took a different view of the matter, per-
haps disagreeing less with the lower court's rationale than with its
application to "this case.' 95 Portions of the Court's opinion swept
rather broadly, however,'96 and at least one passage seemed to sug-
189. See supra text accompanying notes 95-102 & 172-78.
190. Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1114. Few, perhaps, were really surprised by the failure
to achieve NEPA's ideal. See, e.g., Cramton & Berg, On Leading A Horse to Water: NEPA
and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511, 533 (1973).
191. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 549-58 (1978).
192. In re Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), 7 A.E.C. 19 (1974).
193. Id. at 24. This "test" had three elements. To obtain Commission consideration of
an "energy conservation alternative," intervenors had to show: First, that it would "curtail
demand for electricity to a level at which the proposed facility would not be needed"; sec-
ond, that it was "reasonably available"; and third, that its efficacy was susceptible to a rea-
sonable degree of proof. Id.
194. Aeschliman, 547 F.2d at 628.
195. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 550.
196. See generally Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law
Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699 (1979).
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gest that the AEC had little if any business considering energy
conservation at all:
There is little doubt that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, state
public utility commissions or similar bodies are empowered to make the ini-
tial decision regarding the need for power. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k). The Commis-
sion's prime area of concern in the licensing context, on the other hand, is
public health and safety, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2132, 2133, 2201. And it is clear that
the need, as that term is conventionally used, for the power was thoroughly
explored in the hearings. Even the Federal Power Commission, which regu-
lates sales in interstate commerce, agreed with Consumers Power's analysis of
projected need.
NEPA, of course has altered slightly the statutory balance, requiring "a
detailed statement by the responsible official on . . .alternatives to the pro-
posed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). 197
The implications of this language are less than clear. One
writer has asserted that it "announces no change in the accepted
obligation to address real and workable alternatives" including the
"no-action" alternative,919 but this seems to ignore the implication
that the Commission's responsibility to consider energy conserva-
tion alternatives was clearly diminished because an "initial deci-
sion regarding the need for power" was to be made by "state pub-
lic utility commissions or similar bodies."199 On the other hand, it
would seem wrong to interpret this language to mean that the
Commission was relieved entirely of its NEPA obligation to con-
sider energy conservation alternatives to a proposed power plant.
After all, the Court refers to "public health and safety" as the
Commission's "prime [not its exclusive] area of concern" and,
while it is true that the Atomic Energy Act gave the Commission
no responsibility to determine "need for power," the Court does
acknowledge that "NEPA, of course has altered slightly the statu-
tory balance by requiring a detailed statement of alternatives.
'200
In addition, the Court had subscribed unanimously to the view
that NEPA responsibilities could be relieved only by a "clear and
unavoidable conflict of statutory duty" only two terms before,2 °1
197. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 550-51.
198. Rodgers, supra note 196, at 726.
199. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1717 (1983) ("Need for new power facilities" is an area "character-
istically governed by the states").
200. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 550-51.
201. Id. See Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 778
(1976).
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and there seems no reason to suppose that it would retreat so soon.
Certainly, no such "conflict" was present. Section 274(k) of the
Atomic Energy Act 02 is the only statutory provision which the
Court cited in connection with its observation that "under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, state public utility commissions or
similar bodies are to make the initial decision regarding the need
for power. 20 3 That section, however, has been termed a "garden-
variety nonpreemption clause" 2 G0--that is, one which "merely en-
sures that the authority of ... [the states] will continue,
unimpaired by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act... [not]
that the regulatory field is completely closed to the
Commission.
'20 5
If, as a fair reading of Vermont Yankee suggests, the Commis-
sion's role in making the need for power determination falls some-
where between the extremes of "no authority" and "plenary au-
thority," the question remains: Just where does it fall? What does
it mean to say, as the Court does, that "NEPA has altered slightly
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1971).
203. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 550.
204. Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v. NRC, 582 F.2d 77, 85 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978). See also South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d
674 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that the states retain authority to regulate both the timing and
fuel type of new power plant construction).
205. Detroit Edison Co. v. NRC, 630 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1980). It is curious that the
court cited § 274(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k), rather than § 271, 42 U.S.C. § 2018, since the latter
section seems more easily read to reserve the "need for power" determination to the states.
Section 274 authorizes the Commission to enter into agreements with the states, allowing
them to regulate certain uses of nuclear materials, and subsection (k) provides: "Nothing in
this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any state or local agency to regulate
activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards" (emphasis added).
Section 271 declares that: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the authority or
regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or
transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the
Commission.. . ..." (emphasis added).
On other occasions the Supreme Court has chosen to read language like the "in this
section" language of § 271 more literally than it did in Vermont Yankee. See City of Mil-
waukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (construing § 505(e) of the 1972 amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 888 (codified at
33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976)). In any event, the lower courts which have addressed problems
involving the federal-state allocation of authority to regulate activities implicating the li-
censing of nuclear power plants generally have examined both sections and concluded that
neither was intended as a limitation on federal authority. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v.
NRC, 630 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1980); Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v. NRC, 582 F.2d 77
(1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
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the statutory balance"? 206 By themselves the words are cryptic, but
the Commission quickly construed them as an invitation to relieve
itself of major responsibility for "need" determinations in its li-
censing proceedings; henceforth the appeal board ruled, it would
accept the "need" determinations made by "local regulatory bod-
ies" unless they were shown to "rest upon a flatly flawed founda-
tion. 2 0 7 The AEC was thus finally able to free itself of the obliga-
tion to think about the "unthinkable '20 8 and, despite the lament of
NEPA purists who maintain "there is no more important aspect of
NEPA than the obligation to discuss" the no-action alternative,09
the loss to effective regulation of nuclear capacity expansion will
be nil. The Commission's "need" determinations have always been
shams; an outgrowth of the federal government's overall lack of
responsibility for managing bulk power supply.
This lack of federal managerial responsibility often has been a
target for criticism. Numerous studies have found fault with state
supervision of bulk power systems, either because of operational
economies of scale amenable to capture only by regulation on a
broader geographic basis, or because the individual states are dis-
couraged by the fear of competitive disadvantages from regulatory
initiatives which might result in higher electricity prices.210 Recom-
mendations for "regional" regulation or regulation by a federal
agency on a "regional" basis, however, have generated precious lit-
tle legislative enthusiasm211 and, with the exception of the Pacific
206. 435 U.S. at.551.
207. In re Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 and
4), 8 N.R.C. 234 (1978); In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. (Sterling Power Project Nuclear
Unit No. 1), 8 N.R.C. 383 (1978). More recently, the NRC has provided, by rule, that it will
no longer consider "need for power" and alternative energy source issues in operating li-
cense proceedings. See Need For Power and Alternative Energy Issues in Operating License
Proceedings, 47 Fed. Reg. 12940 (1982).
208. In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Power Station), 7
A.E.C. 159, 173 (1974) ("The alternative of not meeting real demand is unthinkable").
209. See Rodgers, supra note 196, at 726.
210. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL POWER GRID STUDY, supra note 6; A TimE To CHOOSE,
supra note 12, at 265-66 (1974); ELECTmciTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 268-
70, 283-84; FEDERAL POWER COMM'N, REPORT ON THE NORTHEAST POWER FAILURE 6 (1965)
("the enormous development of interstate power networks in the last thirty years requires a
reevaluation of the governmental responsibility for continuity of the service supplied by
them, since it is impossible for a single state effectively to regulate the service from an
interstate pool or grid").
211. See generally Lagansa, State Utility Commissions as Vestigal Organs: The Need
For Regional Governance of Electric Utilities, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 291 (1980). It was not
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Northwest, there seems little likelihood of any such capability be-
ing developed in the near future.212 Unfortunately, the "second
best" approach, federal or state management of bulk power supply,
is by no means clear. 213 For this reason alone, further experimenta-
tion in what Brandeis termed the "state laboratories"2 14 seems
preferable to federal preemption, especially in light of the fact that
the costs of both conventional generation and nonsupply alterna-
tive energy sources are not characterized by national uniformity. In
addition, the history of our inability to fashion a national energy
policy 21 5 suggests that the federal control over bulk power regula-
tion would more likely produce paralysis than progress.
Thus, while the quality of the "need for power" determina-
tions made by a federal agency (such as the NRC or the FERC)
could be improved by granting the agency authority to implement
alternatives to utility-sponsored capacity expansion, such a major
reallocation of regulatory responsibility still seems unwise. Never-
theless, there appears little reason to perpetuate the practice of
sham determinations of "need" by federal licensing agencies; if, as
seems best, the states are to retain the authority to manage bulk
power systems, then the authority to determine when there is a
"need" for new capacity ought to be theirs as well.
until after the 1965 Northeast power failure that Congress first gave the FPC authority to
compel utility coordination and interconnection. Even then, the FPC could act only tempo-
rarily in the event of an emergency or upon the complaint of a utility or state PUC. See
Federal Power Act of 1965, § 202, 49 Stat. 848 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §.824a(c)
(1976)). The Commission (now known as FERC) just recently has been given the power to
act on its own motion. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act § 202, 16 U.S.C. § 824i
(1978).
212. In December, 1980, Congress passed The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Plan-
ning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980), making regional energy
supply management a reality in the Pacific Northwest. Regionalization could succeed in this
area because of a unique combination of circumstances. A growing fear of capacity shortages
had placed a premium on the efficient management of power resources. In addition, regional
management was not wholly revolutionary; a large share of the area's capacity always has
been composed of federal hydroelectric projects whose generation has been marketed by the
Bonneville Power Administration, the entity which continues to provide the administrative
framework for comprehensive energy supply management under the new Act.
213. See generally LANDSBERG, ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 521-25 (1979). See
also Lagansa, supra note 211 (recommending state level regulation on a cooperative basis);
ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 268-71, 283-84 (recommending regula-
tion by a federal agency).
214. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
215. See Goldsmith & Banks, Book Reviews, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 157, 157-58 (1980).
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2. State regulation. It is plainly evident that much needs to
be done to improve the quality of state regulation of utility capac-
ity expansion.2 16 First, however, the reasons for the ineffectiveness
of state regulation need to be better understood. The widely held
belief is that state regulation failed because the states lacked ex-
pertise in the techniques of forecasting,21 but this view appears to
rest upon a misapprehension of the role forecasts have really
played in the decision process. As has been shown, "need" is deter-
mined by a process which conciliates competing forecasts, not one
which analyzes them.21 ' The notion that state regulation would
have been better if only the states had developed sooner a sophisti-
cated forecasting capability thus seems to make too much of a fail-
ing which, at worst, contributed only marginally to a more deeply
rooted institutional problem. In fact, state regulation was doomed
from the start because it was undertaken in the context of either
facility certification or ratemaking proceedings; neither setting pro-
vided a viable framework for the effective supervision of capacity
expansion.
Facility certification proceedings (whether held by a siting
agency or a PUC) have suffered from the same design defect as
that which crippled the AEC; they could culminate only in ap-
proval or disapproval of a utility-proposed capacity addition.2 9 An
216. See generally ELECTRICITY PLANNING, supra note 77, 14-38; IMPROVING REGULA-
TORY EFFECTIVENESS IN FEDERAL/STATE SITING ACTIONS, supra note 77, at 6-8.
217. IMPROVING REGULATORY EFFEcnvENEss IN FEDERAL/STATE SITING ACTIONS, supra
note 77, at 6-8.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 106-22.
219. In New York, a rather feeble effort was made to deal with this problem by requir-
ing all applications for power plant certification to include not only the environmental data
needed to license the proposed facility, but a complete set of such data for a facility at a
different site. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 70.20 (1972). The theory behind this "two
complete case" requirement was, of course, that a siting board could not realistically be
expected to evaluate a utility proposal unless, at the same time, it had the opportunity to
consider "fall back" alternatives, i.e., those that could and would be implemented. See N.Y.
PUB. SERV. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON ARTICLE VIII OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE LAW 12 (1977)
(document on file with the NYPSC). To a certain extent, the requirement has worked. See,
e.g., In re Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station), N.Y. Bd. on Elec.
GS-E Case No. 80003 (Sept. 8, 1980) (certifying one coal-fired unit instead of two proposed
nuclear plants); In re New York State Elec. & Gas Co. (Somerset Electric Generating Sta-
tion), N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E, No. 80002 (Dec. 29, 1978) (certifying coal-fired plant at "al-
ternative" site rather than "primary" site). On the other hand, since the utility-proposed
alternative to a large nuclear unit was always an equally large coal station (or vice versa),
the "two complete case" requirement never operated to prompt siting board consideration
of decentralized "alternatives" to capacity expansion. The utilities have found the require-
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agency which concluded, for example, that some alternative combi-
nation of conservation measures and decentralized energy sources
was more in the public interest than an increment of conventional
generating capacity, would have been unable to assure implemen-
tation of its preferred alternative. Disapproval of a utility proposed
power plant thus would have carried with it the risk that a real
need for energy might go unmet, a risk that state regulators found
no easier to face than did their federal counterparts.2 0 Unfortu-
nately, this notion that central station capacity deficiencies were
unthinkable tended to guarantee regulatory approval of utility pro-
posed expansion. Given the great uncertainty inherent in long-
range forecasts, an examination of the comparative costs of un-
derbuilding versus overbuilding should have played a pivotal role
in every facility certification proceeding. Incredibly, it seems never
to have been squarely faced.221
Ratemaking proceedings also failed to provide a suitable set-
ting for the control of capacity expansion. Traditionally, these pro-
ceedings have looked backwards; that is, rates for the future have
been fixed on the basis of a company's experience during a histori-
cal "test year. ' '22 2 Rateregulators thus had no opportunity to pre-
view proposed investments. They were, of course, empowered to
ment onerous; see Cronin & Turner, Article VIII of the Public Service Law - The Brave
New World of Power Plant Siting In New York: A Critique and Suggestion For An Alter-
native Approach, 42 ALB. L. REv. 537, 545-56 (1978).
220. See, e.g., In re Arkansas Power & Light Co., Ark. PSC Opinion No. U-2903 (Aug.
31, 1978), where the Arkansas Pubic Service Commission approved the construction of a
1400 Mw coal-fired generating station notwithstanding its "belief that the soft path is the
preferred path and that in most instances both utilities and consumers will benefit from
substituting energy conservation for construction of new generating capacity." Id. at 8. See
also In re Long Island Lighting Co., N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80003, at 13 (coal
plant certified despite a State Energy Master Plan which called for the development of low-
head hydroelectric capacity because "we cannot now assure that specific amounts of new
hydro capacity will be available as a substitute for future base load generation").
221. The issue has been glossed over in a number of nuclear licensing proceedings. See,
e.g., the discussion of the Seabrook decision, supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text; see
also In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 7 A.E.C. 1046, 1047 (1974) (completion of Nine
Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, one year early would produce an economic benefit but
that completion several years early would 'probably' result in economic loss"); In re Roches-
ter Gas & Elec. Corp., 6 N.R.C. 350, 407-08 (1977) (concluding that "some economic benefit"
would result from early completion of Sterling Power Project Nuclear Unit No. 1). Cf. Ford
& Yabroff, Defending Against Uncertainty in the Electric Utility Industry, 4 ENERGY SYS.
& POL'Y 57 (1980) (arguing that underexpansion is less costly than overexpansion).




disallow past investments found to have been imprudent, but as we
have seen, such after-the-fact review came too late to be
effective.223
It is becoming more common today for ratemaking proceed-
ings to be forward-looking, with rates fixed on the basis of pre-
dicted experience during a future test year.224 While this will pro-
vide rateregulators with an occasional opportunity to appraise the
prudence of a proposed investment in capacity expansion before it
is made, most investment in new capacity will still be made in ad-
vance of regulatory review. Since all such expenditures are initially
capitalized, they have no impact upon rates until they are included
in a company's rate base. As has already been noted, this ordi-
narily will not occur before the facility goes into service unless the
company is in serious financial difficulty and seeks earlier rate rec-
ognition of its investment, e.g., by seeking rate base inclusion for
CWIP.22 5 By then, of course, the company's financial commitment
to expansion is substantial and regulatory review once again has
occurred after-the-fact.2 2
In addition to their other drawbacks, both certification and
ratemaking proceedings, with their focus on a single facility or a
single company, provide too narrow a perspective for the regula-
tion of capacity expansion. Years ago, a new generating unit would
be built by a single utility company to meet its own capacity re-
quirements. Today, however, new units are commonly owned by
several companies who integrate their operations through coopera-
tive arrangements known as power pools. 227 While this has enabled
companies to achieve large economies of scale in the cost of owning
new plants, by reducing the amount of excess capacity which
would otherwise be created on a single company's system when a
new unit is brought into service, it has also broadened the scope of
223. See supra text accompanying notes 63-74.
224. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON TEST PERIODS IN MA-
JOR RATE PROCEEDINGS (Nov. 23, 1977).
225. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
226. See In re Commonwealth Edison Co., NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,168 (II.
Commerce Comm'n, Oct. 15, 1980) ("Once substantial expenditures have been made in the
construction of generating plants, little flexibility, if any, exists to change the scheduled
completion of such plants without incurring substantial penalties").
227. See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., NYPSC Opinion No. 77-23, at 8-9
(Dec. 5, 1977) (approving cotenancy agreement by which ownership of 1,100 Mw nuclear
power plant was shared among five utilities).
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the "need for power" issue. Whereas "need" previously could be
determined by examining the reserve margin requirements and
production costs of a single utility, the appropriate reliability and
economic considerations implicated by the proposal of a new power
plant are now those of a multi-company power pool. Trying to ex-
plore these system-wide considerations in either a ratemaking pro-
ceeding (which focuses on a single company) or a certification pro-
ceeding (which focuses on a single facility) will thus raise two
serious risks; either system-wide questions will not be addressed as
they should be,22 or the same system-wide questions will be ex-
amined repeatedly in individual proceedings.
229
Generic or "state-wide" proceedings offer a less obvious ad-
vantage as well. Having to make the "need for power" determina-
tion on a generic basis should encourage the regulators to address
the broad policy questions which it presents. Properly considered,
the "need" determination involves more than long-range forecasts
of load and capacity requirements and comparative generating eco-
nomics. Since the marketplace cannot work as an efficient allocator
of capacity resources, 3 0 it is entirely appropriate for government
to promote those patterns of energy use which are efficient. Thus,
in making the "need" determination, government regulators ought
228. See In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., NYPSC Opinion No. 27855 (Moynihan,
A.L.J. Aug. 13, 1981) (company argued that the needs of the New York Power Pool justified
its retention of a site for future generation, but the administrative law judge determined
that the prudence of the company's investment should be made by looking only at the com-
pany's needs).
229. For an example of the wasteful duplication of effort invited by examining the
"need" question in four individual facility certification proceedings, see In re New York
State Gas & Elec. Co., N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80002 (Dec. 29, 1978); In re Long
Island Lighting Co., N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80003 (Sept. 8, 1980); In re Rochester
Gas & Elec. Co., N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80005 (Feb. 11, 1980); In re Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., N.Y. Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80007 (Dec. 29, 1978). Four differ-
ent facilities were proposed by companies in the seven member New York Power Pool, two
by individual companies, one by two companies, and one by four companies. The installa-
tion dates planned for the four facilities were 1983-1984, 1988-1990, and 1990-1992. In each
proceeding the siting board was thus required to review the entire Pool's load and capacity
forecasts for overlapping periods.
Prior to the accident at Three Mile Island, the NRC began steps-which it never com-
pleted-to eliminate case-by-case consideration of generic "need" issues in its reactor licens-
ing proceedings. See NRC Interim Policy Statement: Generic Rulemaking to Improve Nu-
clear Power Plant Licensing, 43 Fed. Reg. 58377 (Dec. 14, 1978); NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON GENERAL POLICY FOR RULEMAKING TO IMPROVE Nu-
CLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING, NUREG-0499 (1978).
230. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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to decide not only how much central station capacity will be de-
manded, but also how much of our energy requirements, as a mat-
ter of policy, should be provided by conventional generation and
how much by alternative energy sources. Case-by-case decision
making, under the influence of trial-type procedures, has perpetu-
ated an atomistic perspective which has done more to obscure this
policy content of the "need for power" determination than to illu-
minate it.
A few states have moved away from the traditional case-by-
case approach and have begun to consider the "need for power"
question in connection with the preparation of comprehensive
state plans for overall energy supply. 31 These state-wide proceed-
ings offer an improved setting for the supervision of capacity plan-
ning for several reasons; they are timely, they invite bulk power
expansion to be examined as just one of several available alterna-
tive energy sources and, most importantly, they shift the initiative
in energy supply planning from utility management to public offi-
cials. Unfortunately, the potential benefits from this shift are not
likely to be fully realized because these newly created planning
agencies, like their more reactive predecessors, have no power to
implement their plans.232 In New York, for example, while a state
energy master plan is now prepared every two years by the Energy
Planning Board, the proposal of a new generating station remains
the prerogative of utility management, the certification of the pro-
posed station remains the responsibility of a siting board (the
Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment), and
rate recognition of the investment in the station remains the re-
sponsibility of the Public Service Commission. 233
This diffusion of authority promises to retard real improve-
231. See generally THE NEED FOR POWER AND THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGIES: STATE DE-
CISIONS ON ELECTRIC POWER FACILITIES, supra note 65, at 5. California, New York and Wis-
consin led the way. SEE CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25000 (West 1977), added by 1974 Cal. Stat.
501; N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 5-112 (McKinney 1968), added by 1978 N.Y. Laws c. 707; Wisc.
Stat. Ann. § 196.491 (West 1983), added by 1975 Wisc. Laws c. 68.
232. See, e.g., Advance Plans for Construction of Facilities, 05-EP-1 (Wisc. PSC, Aug.
11, 1978). In connection with its review of the state's utilities' long-range expansion plan,
the PSC made a 90% reduction in the companies' demand projections to allow for the esti-
mated effects of conservation, but declined to impose limits on capacity additions in favor of
alternative sources because of its duty "to insure a reasonably adequate supply of electric
power." Id. at 6 (emphasis supplied).




ment in the control of capacity expansion. Where provisions in
some state plans for increased reliance upon alternative energy
sources are not self-fulfilling, it is disingenuous to expect that their
mere existence will prompt siting boards to reject utility proposals
for new power plants to meet forecast energy requirements.2 4 Per-
functory certification of the need for such proposed expansion is
thus likely to continue, and rate regulation will suffer as well. As
has been noted, the construction of a new baseload generating unit
can be expected to exert enormous upward pressure on a com-
pany's rates, and thereby impose a significant revenue obligation
on its customers for perhaps three to five decades. Control of such
capacity expansion therefore ought to be given to an agency that
also has the responsibility and the competence to fix rates.2 35 Sepa-
ration of these functions simply invites the stultification of rate
regulation; certification of a proposed plant will later require a
PUC to recognize the costs of the plant in a utility's rates,23 even
though the certifying agency's consideration of the revenue impli-
cations of its decision may well have been inadequate.3
234. See, e.g., In re Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station), N.Y.
Bd. on Elec. GS-E Case No. 80003, at 13 (Sept. 8, 1980) (licensing an 800 Mw coal plant
despite provisions of the State Energy Master Plan proposing development of 1,000 Mw of
small-scale hydropower facilities "because these proposals have for the most part not yet
advanced beyond the conceptual stage...").
235. There would be nothing novel about such an arrangement. Before the recent crea-
tion of siting boards and energy planning agencies, PUCs had (but rarely exercised) respon-
sibility for the regulation of capacity expansion, see supra text accompanying notes 3-15.
Even today this arrangement survives in many states. See THE NEED FOR POWER AND THE
CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGIES: STATE DECISIONS ON ELECTRIC POWER FACII.rrms, supra note 75, at
5-18. A similar approach is also taken today in connection with federal supervision of inter-
state gas pipelines; FERC regulates both capacity and rates in an integrated way. See, e.g.,
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 689 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding issuance by
FERC of certificate of public convenience and necessity for construction of offshore pipeline
and gathering system which conditioned future rate recognition of the facility on achieve-
ment of a 60% load factor).
236. See, e.g., In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., NYPSC Opinion No. 81-1 at 12 (Jan.
6, 1981) (in rate proceeding to determine whether utility could recover the costs of a can-
celled nuclear power project, prior certification by the Siting Board which was issued in
1978 but revoked in 1980 was "conclusive on the issue of need for the facility. . . and is
entitled to great weight . . . on the issue of [the utility's] prudence").
237. See, e.g., STATE ENERGY PLANNING PROCEEDINGS, supra note 26, at 133-34 (ac-




B. Promoting Better Investments
The restructuring of our regulatory institutions, while promis-
ing some benefits, does not address the root cause of the problem,
which remains embedded in the economics of power production;
utility profits are closely tied to investment in large scale, capital
intensive, bulk power facilities.2 Thus, it is perhaps not unduly
cynical to anticipate that when utility planners gaze into their
crystal balls for a view of the fifteen year future, they will continue
to see a world where the demand for bulk power grows steadily,
where energy conservation measures are not adequate to slow this
growth, and where new, decentralized sources of energy are always
"promising" but never quite ready to make a significant contribu-
tion to the nation's energy supplies. 239 Utilities therefore will con-
tinue to see a "need" for additional generating capacity and to
press for approval of capacity expansion plans.24 ° It is also reasona-
ble to expect that the regulators will continue to find it difficult to
reject these plans even when they have doubts about the utility
companies' vision of the fifteen year future; these "doubts," accom-
panied by mere "hopes" for the emergence of alternative energy
sources, simply do not provide public officials with sufficient foot-
ing on which to take a stand against a multi-billion dollar private
238. See In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., Cal. PUC Opinion D.84902 (Sept. 16, 1975). In
that decision, the California PUC wrote:
At present, the financial incentives for utilities are for increased sales, not con-
servation. Whatever conservation efforts utilities undertake are the result of
good citizenship, rather than profit motivation. We applaud these efforts, but we
think the task will be better accomplished if financial and civic motivations were
not at cross purposes.
Id. at 162; Cf. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co. v. PSC, 71 A.D.2d 185, 422 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1979);
Brooklyn Union Gas v. PSC, 71 A.D.2d 171, 422 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1979) (utility challenges to
New York legislation requiring them to finance residential conservation).
239. See, e.g., Elec. Utility Executives Forum, 107 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 67 (1981); Maher,
supra note 58 (utility management preoccupation with system "reliability" inherently pro-
motes overexpansion of capacity); ELETRImITY PLANNING, supra note 77, at ch. 4 (utility
estimates of minimal near-term contributions to energy supply from decentralized sources
are unduly pessimistic); ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) No. 384, at 18 (Apr. 10, 1980) (utility
executives continue to see near-term possibility of "massive electrical blackouts").
240. See, e.g., One Time Rate Hike of 12.5% Recommended to Bolster Sagging Indus-
try, 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 1079-80 (1982) (poor financial condition of industry has
produced temporary lull in new construction but "pent up demand awaiting economic re-
covery" means that the "next round of decisions on adding generating capacity is ... three
to five years away").
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proposal.
41
A more solid foundation for effective regulation would exist if
the utilities themselves were provided the opportunity to invest in
decentralized sources of energy, including conservation. Under
such circumstances, regulators could do more than simply disap-
prove of utility proposed bulk power expansion; through creative
rate regulation they could also provide the companies with a
financial incentive to make more efficient energy supply invest-
ments."" This power to say "yes" would not only add to the effi-
cacy of saying "no"; it would also reduce the number of occasions
where the power to say "no" was necessary. As such, it would re-
241. A dramatic example is provided by two recent decisions of the New York Public
Service Commission. In 1981, the PSC began an investigation of the financial and economic
implications of the continued construction of a nuclear power project which had experienced
an escalation in direct (exclusive of AFC) construction costs of from $381 million to more
than $2.4 billion. The Environmental Defense Fund intervened and presented, as an alter-
native to completion of the nuclear unit, a substantial investment by the plant's sponsors in
end-use conservation, cogeneration and low-head hydropower. The PSC rejected the propo-
sal, concluding that it was an "unsuitable alternative" for completion of the power plant
because of unspecified "legal, administrative and practical obstacles." In re Financial and
Economic Cost Implications of Constructing the Nine Mile Point No. 2 Nuclear Station,
NYPSC Opinion No. 82-7, at 16-17 (Apr. 16, 1982). At the same time, the PSC was suffi-
ciently impressed with the EDF proposal to launch a generic investigation of end-use con-
servation programs. Order Establishing Proceeding, NYPSC Opinion No. 28223 (Boschwitz,
A.L.J., Jan. 20, 1983).
Conservation programs similar to the one proposed by EDF are already being implemented
in Arkansas, California, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas and Wash-
ington; see Financial and Economic Cost Implications of Constructing the Nine Mile Point
No. 2 Nuclear Station, NYPSC Opinion No. 82-7, at 15 (Comm'rs Mead & Pooler, dissent-
ing). It is apparent that such programs have a much better chance of regulatory approval if
they are not offered as an alternative to a specific, utility-sponsored construction project.
See, for example, a series of decisions by the California PUC which have spurred the imple-
mentation of a substantial end-use conservation program by the state's largest utility; In re
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., Cal. PUC Opinion D.84902 (Sept. 16, 1975); In re Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., Cal. PUC Opinion D.89316 (Sept. 6, 1978); In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., Cal.
PUC Opinion D.91107 (Dec. 19, 1979); In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., D.93887 (Dec. 30,
1981).
242. See generally Gentry, Public Utility Participation In Decentralized Power Pro-
duction, 5 HARv. ENVT'L L. REv. 297, 336-39 (1981). The California PUC has already taken
modest steps in this direction, see In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., Cal. PUC Opinion D.91107,
at 180-86 (Dec. 19, 1979) (penalizing the utility $7.2 million, by reducing its rate of return
on equity twenty basing points, because of inadequate efforts to promote cogeneration); In
re Southern Cal. Gas Co., Cal. PUC Opinion D.82-10-021 (Oct. 6, 1982) (providing the com-
pany with a $5 million rate reward for success in implementing a conservation program).
See also CAL. PUB. UTn. CODE § 454 (West Supp. 1978), added by 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 835
(authorizing the PUC to increase a utility's rate of return by up to 1% for investment in
renewable energy sources).
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store to utility management much of the responsibility for invest-
ment initiatives which, under regulation, has been shifted to public
officials.
Other benefits could be expected as well. First, since the lead
times of alternative sources would be shorter than those of central
station capacity, energy supply plans could be formulated with less
uncertainty than that which currently characterizes fifteen to
twenty year expansion plans.243 Second, since utility profits no
longer would be linked solely to the expansion of large central sta-
tion generation, industry forecasts of the future need for such gen-
eration would be more credible than is currently the case. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, by enabling the vast financial re-
sources of the nation's electric utilities to be invested voluntarily in
other than conventional power plants, the arrival on a large scale
of alternative energy resources which are economic, safe, environ-
mentally benign, and renewable will be accelerated significantly.
244
This development in turn would facilitate the total deregulation of
electric generation.2 "
243. See, e.g., Boyd & Thompson, supra note 49.
244. See generally TALBOT & MORGAN, POWER AND LIGHT. POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR
THE SOLAR TRANSITION (1981) (concluding that utility financing may be a necessary step in
the solar transition); FELDMAN & WIRTSHAFLER, ON THE ECONOMICS OF SOLAR ENERGY 180-
209 (1979). Two factors can be expected to contribute to a speed-up in the market penetra-
tion of these new energy sources. First, utility opposition-which has been tenacious-will
diminish, see Gentry, supra note 242, at 315-17; Cross, Cogeneration: Its Potential and
Incentives for Development, 3 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV. 236, 240-41 (1979) ("Utility antago-
nism has been a major force frustrating the development of cogeneration"); Lodge, The
Windmill Case: Facing Up to the Appropriate Technology, 6 ENv. AFF. 491, 498 (1078);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Realty Inv. Ass'n, 524 F. Supp 50, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (in action
brought to enjoin building owner from construction of cogeneration equipment because of
alleged violations of Clean Air Act, the court observed that "Con Ed has utilized its consid-
erable muscle in opposing the use of cogeneration"). Second, utility financing will not be
slowed by the inertia of consumer investment; see supra text accompanying note 102.
245. Congress took a major step toward deregulation of electric generation in enacting
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. IV 1980). This provi-
sion requires the nation's electric utilities to purchase power from qualifying cogenerators
and small power producers at "just and reasonable" rates to be fixed by the states in accor-
dance with standards prescribed by FERC, and authorizes FERC to exempt such qualifying
facilities from federal and state public utility regulation. FERC's implementing regulations
were issued in 1980, Small Power Production and Cogenerating Facilities-Qualifying Sta-
tus, 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.101-602 (1982), and were recently upheld by the Supreme Court.
American Paper Inst., 103 S. Ct. at 1927. While PURPA excludes utility-owned facilities
from its provisions, see 16 U.S.C. § 796 17(C)18(B),(C) (Supp. IV 1980) and 18 C.F.R. §
292.206 (1980), the states remain free to permit such ownership. See, e.g., N.Y. Pun. SERV.
LAW § 66-c (McKinney Supp. 1982), added by 1980 N.Y. Laws c. 553, § 7 (allowing utilities
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The industry will not respond overnight. The institutional
prerogatives of growth and centralization are too deeply embedded
and the institutional preference for the management of a few large
projects rather than thousands of small ones is too deeply in-
grained to anticipate sudden change.24 Nevertheless, enlightened
self-interest can be expected to reorder gradually the industry's in-
vestment priorities. 247 Of course, utility participation in the devel-
opment of decentralized energy sources, including conservation,
will present new problems which just barely have begun to receive
consideration. 24s These include a concern for the maintenance of
competition in the energy conservation and small scale energy
source markets,249 the difficulty of assuring the effectiveness of
to form wholly-owned, unregulated subsidiaries to develop small scale (less than 80 Mw)
cogeneration facilities). For more extensive proposals of deregulation, see supra note 142.
246. See Gilmer & Meunier, Electric Utilities and Solar Energy: The Service Contract
in a New Social Context, 30 MERCER L. REV. 377, 383-88 (1979); Maher, supra note 58.
247. Some utility executives have already perceived that investment in on-site energy
sources is, in the long run, in the industry's best interests. See, e.g., ENERGY USERS REP.
(BNA) No. 352, at 13 (May 8, 1980), quoting an officer of the American Public Power Asso-
ciation: "If they are to survive, utilities must no longer see their responsibilities ending at
the meter. If the consumer's need for heating, for example, can be better served by applying
insulation, or by installing solar collectors, then we must be in a position to assist the con-
sumer in providing those previously non-traditional utility services." See also Laitos, Elec-
tric Utilities and Residential Solar Development, in ENERGY AND COMMUNICATIONS IN TRAN-
SITION, supra note 88, at 322 ("significant" number of utilities have decided to invest in
residential solar energy applications).
248. See STATE ENERGY PLANNING PROCEEDINGS, supra note 26, at 72-73 (recommending
study of potential problems by a task force). See generally Finklea & Treiber, Residential
Energy Conservation Measures: A Penny Saved Is a Penny Earned, 11 ENV. L. 639, 671-78
(1981); FELDMAN & WIRTHSHAFTER supra, note 244; Sparrow, Public Utility Involvement
With Distributed Solar Systems, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 955-70 (1980); Laitos & Feurstein, May
Regulated Utilities Monopolize the Sun?, 56 DEN. L. J. 31 (1979).
249. See, e.g., Kellman, De-Utilizing the Energy Industry: Planning the Solar Transi-
tion, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1980); Laitos & Feurstein, supra note 248; Laurence & Minan,
The Competitive Aspect of Utility Participation in Solar Development, 54 IND. L. J. 229
(1979). In 1978, the fear that utility participation in the development of small scale energy
resources (including conservation) would have anticompetitive effects led to the enactment §
216 of the National Energy Conservation and Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, § 216,
92 Stat. 3217 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 8217 (Supp. IV 1980)) [NECPA]. NECPA
prohibited utility "supply, installation or financing" of "residential conservation mea-
sure[s]," a term which was defined to include alternative energy sources utilizing solar en-
ergy. See NECPA § 210(11), 42 U.S.C. § 8211(11) (Supp. IV 1980). Termed a "major blun-
der," see ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 3, at 231, this restriction on utility investment was
later substantially relaxed. See Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-294, § 546, 94 Stat. 719, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 8217 (Supp. IV 1980)).
See also Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. PSC, 71 A.D.2d 185, 422 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1979) (strik-
ing down PSC rule which prohibited utility residential energy auditors from recommending
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conservation measures, 250 and the need to design new rate struc-
tures which will apportion equitably the revenue obligations aris-
ing from these unconventional investments.2 51 While serious, these
problems can be dealt with at a cost which seems clearly out-
weighed by the benefits. At the very least, the potential benefits
seem signficant enough to justify experimentation.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the causes and serious conse-
quences of the electric utility industry's persistent tendency to
overestimate the future need for new generating stations. It also
has been shown that this tendency cannot be counteracted effec-
tively by regulation which presupposes an ability to expose the in-
dustry's forecasting errors. Currently proposed regulatory reforms,
which are designed simply to enable the utilities to finance their
construction plans, are thus fundamentally flawed. It is evident,
moreover, that these plans will not be abandoned by the utilities
until it is in their financial interests to do so. Accordingly, this Ar-
ticle has suggested that the nation's utilites be provided the oppor-
tunity and incentive to develop alternative energy sources. In the
long run, an approach which promotes "good" investment deci-
sions by the industry is vastly preferable to one which relies upon
the prevention of "bad" ones by the government.
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"[i]t is impossible to determine at this time . ., whether or not PG & E's claimed savings
are true and . . . whether or not such savings indicate an effective conservation program.
For example, factors other than conservation may slow demand in an area, and conversely,
there may be significant conservation even with increased demand." Id. at 55.
251. See, e.g., Bryson and Elliott, California's Best Energy Supply Investment: Inter-
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Utility Financing for Residential Conservation Measures, 107 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 28 (1981);
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